Abstract

ABSTRACT The United Kingdom’s strategy for negotiating Brexit involved a misapprehension: that the EU-27 would divide and concede to UK demands. In this article, we provide one explanation for this misapprehension: a pervasive ‘Merkel myth’ widely accepted within the British political class. That myth skewed British understanding of the European Union’s power balance and priorities. It privileged an interpretation of Merkel as a decisive influence in Europe, well-disposed to the UK. Alongside this was the belief that Merkel would come under pressure from Germany’s manufacturing giants to grant the UK a relatively generous deal. The Merkel myth reinforced a political strategy that, by all accounts, never came close to success. Yet these beliefs affected the approach of three prime ministers. Employing the distinctive analytical lens of ‘political myth’ to explain the judgements of actors, the article contributes to a growing literature on the role of ideas in political strategies.

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