Hope as an Intellectual Virtue

Abstract

In the history of philosophy and theology down to contemporary times, hope has been regarded as a passion or as a moral or theological virtue.1 Here I propose to explore hope as an intellectual virtue, thereby following the lead of Roberts and Wood in developing profiles of the intellectual virtues as part of the approach that they call “regulative epistemology.”2 As opposed to analytic epistemology, which attempts to develop a theory of knowledge, regulative epistemology aims to give epistemic guidance about how to formulate beliefs and understandings.3 Virtue epistemology is a type of regulative epistemology that focuses on the virtues a person should have in order to be an excellent intellectual agent. Part I develops a conception of hope, and parts II and III outline respects in which hope so construed can be considered an intellectual virtue. Part IV concludes with a brief mention of some perils associated with hoping.