Abstract
This paper investigates whether Wittgenstein can be considered an ‘ordinary language philosopher’. A central role in his thinking is that of what may be called our ‘home language’ - the language we bring along in coming to do philosophy. The intelligibility of philosophers’ language depends on its relation to the home language. This is the central point of Philosophical Investigations § 116. Traditional philosophical ‘uses’ of a word like ‘knowledge’ have a problematic relation to our customary uses of the word. In consequence, traditional philosophers have sometimes lost the grip on how such words are actually used in human interaction.
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