Hinge Contextualisma

Abstract

AbstractThe paper explores a possible connection between epistemic contextualism and hinge epistemology. My basic idea is that Wittgenstein’s hinge propositions play a possibility‐governing role, in the sense that they govern our knowledge attributions by determining which possibilities count as relevant alternatives. This is a novel proposal with several theoretical advantages for both hinge epistemology and epistemic contextualism. On the one hand, in order to offer a substantial account of the way in which knowledge attributions work, the contextualist needs more than mere formal tools. She needs to tell us what goes inside the contexts that govern our conversations. On the other hand, the hinge epistemologist cannot be satisfied by mere metaphors (like the hinge metaphor). She needs to tell us how hinges can effectively govern our conversations. I take hinge contextualism to be the answer. With the help of hinges, we can furnish contexts; and with the help of contexts, we can put hinges to work.