Abstract

High technology policy has as little to do with the reality of high technology as export controls have to do with the reality of technology transfer. But they have more in common than otherworldliness. Until the late 1970s, much industrial policy in the West was concerned with exploiting technology while reducing the adverse effects of technological change, notably its employment consequences. Export control policy was also concerned with damage limitation: with providing a semblance of control that would not interfere with the reality of détente. By the early 1980s, so apparent were the national benefits to be gained from high technology that it seemed almost irresponsible not to encourage the activity. During the same period, so apparent were the national benefits to be gained from restricting the flow of technology to the Soviet bloc that it seemed irresponsible not to have policy for export controls which really worked. If high technology was important enough to be worth so much public interest, then clearly it was worth preserving from the enemy.KeywordsHigh TechnologyHigh Technology IndustryIntangible CapitalExport ControlSoviet BlocThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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