Abstract
We present a theory for the puzzling issue regarding why certain firms in financial distress, prefer a costlier formal bankruptcy procedure over direct renegotiations. We show that claimholders’ heterogeneous beliefs about the results of a formal plan and about judicial discretion may lead to such a preference. The proposed model predicts which resolution would be chosen under claimholders’ beliefs about the determinants driving the outcome of a formal procedure, such as the extent to which firm value is affected by bankruptcy, the likelihood of deviation from the absolute priority rule, and the probability of the court adopting a reorganization plan.
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More From: The North American Journal of Economics and Finance
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