Heidegger as a delusion of XXth century philosophy

Abstract

The author presents the basic idea of fundamental ontology through a critique of Heidegger in Being and Time (1927), the lecture ?What is Metaphysics? (1929) and the book Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929), including the stances after the turn (Kehre) wen is needed,. The elaboration was carried out concretely by overcoming Heidegger?s strategic shortcomings, due to which Being and Time is a conceptually and methodologicaly unsuccessful book. This is explained by presenting four theses: first, that existential analysis in Being and Time is made impossible by the determination of authenticity; secondly, that the elaboration of fundamental ontology is not possible with the meaning of being as the goal. This one must be temporarily abandoned, in order for it to be possible as an ?ontology of all ontologies?. Thirdly, the fundamental ontology is the ontology of the meaningful-existential foundation of human existence, that elaborates how the world in which a man can exist is constituted. And fourth, further elaboration of fundamental ontology of existential variant is not possible by linking it to the Critique of Pure Mind, what Heidegger attempted in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929). Thus it is explained why Heidegger was unable to provide full explication of fundamental ontology. If he had done so, it would be enough to recognitize him as an important and original philosopher, because fundamental ontology as the ?metaphysics of metaphysics? woul be only possible ?first philosophy? (prote philosophia) in the age of late modernity and the situation of the decline of transcendence.