Subjectivité et projet. La critique patočkienne du concept heideggérien de "projet de possibilités"

Abstract

Subjectivity and Project. Patočka's critique of Heidegger's concept "project of possibilities" The purpose of this article is to lay out the way the main aspects of Patočka's critical reading of Heidegger's fundamental ontology. More precisely, I intend to restate the central arguments Patočka raised against Heidegger's characterization of "understanding" (Verstehen) as a "project". In the first part, I will single out Patočka's project of an "asubjective phenomenology" by distinguishing it from another asubjective project (that of Aristotle) and from the subjective phenomenology. In the second part, I will examine some central theses Heidegger puts forth in §31 of Being and Time in order to show the inescapable difficulties they bring about. In the final part, I will describe the tenets around which Patočka's critical reading of Heidegger revolves. I will explore the two directions of this critique that correspond to the double orientation of asubjective phenomenology: a) on the one hand, the priority of the phenomenal field with regard to any subjective sense-bestowal; b) the importance of the phenomenon of corporeity for an accurate apprehension of subjectivity.