Hare on Universalizability

Abstract

What constitutes a moral judgement as a moral judgement? From popular press to most staid academic circles, this question will provoke lively discussion. Unfortunately, such discourse often gives rise to more heat than light. This essay treats one of more enlightening philosophical debates in recent decades on answer to that question, an exchange that focused on R. M. Hare's view of universalizability of moral judgements as articulated in his Language of Morals and Freedom and Reason. Hare's argument, in this early stage of his work, is important due to its emphasis on universalizability within context of descriptive and requirement of prescriptivity for moral judgements. His treatment of logic of moral discourse is incisive, as provides a coherent approach to nature of ethics. This essay brings Hare into dialogue with his critics Alasdair Maclntyre, Don Locke, and Peter Singer, who attack his position at foundational points. They ask most important questions: Must moral judgements be universalizable and prescriptive to be truly moral? If so, is Hare's position trivial? Does his approach bridge gap between facts and action? Through consideration of these criticisms of Hare, this essay seeks to gain a critical perspective on Hare's view of universalizability. The question addressed throughout this essay is Of what value is Hare's position for understanding nature of moral judgements? The explication of Hare's argument and consideration of his critics' positions provide a rigorous testing of claim that moral judgements must be universalizable. Hare suggests that universalizability is a characteristic is common to all judgements which carry descriptive meaning (1963,10). It follows that any judgement which has descriptive must be universalizable, because descriptive meaning-rules which determine this are universal rules (1963,39). The designation of a judgement as universalizable means for Hare only that logically commits speaker to making a similar judgement about anything which is exactly like subject of original judgement or like in relevant aspects (1963, 139). He understands singular descriptive judgements to be universalizable because they commit the speaker to further proposition that anything exactly like subject of first judgement, or like in relevant respects, possesses property attributed to it in original judgement (1963,12).