Hardware Trojan Detection on a PCB Through Differential Power Monitoring

Abstract

There is a general consensus that contemporary electronics are at risk of cyber-attacks or malicious modifications, such as Hardware Trojans (HT). This makes it crucial to develop reliable countermeasures at both Integrated Circuit (IC) and Printed Circuit Board (PCB) levels. While HT detection at IC level has been widely studied in the past several years, there is still very limited research carried out to tackle HTs on PCBs. We propose a power analysis method for detecting HT components implanted on PCBs. An experimental setup, using a hardware prototype, is built and tested for verification of the methodology, taking process and temperature variations into account. The results confirm the ability to detect alien components on a PCB and provide directions for further research. The performance degradation of the original PCB due to the implementation of the proposed approach is negligible. The area overhead of the proposed method is small, related to the original PCB design, and consists of Sub Power Monitors of individual ICs on the PCB and Main Power Monitor for the overall power measurement of the PCB. To the best of our knowledge this research is the first to develop a PCB HT detection methodology using power analysis.