Abstract

Abstract There is a consensus in the finance literature that stock markets generally perform well ahead of holidays. However, I argue that this relationship does not hold in the Chinese context, given that public holidays are associated with increased collective action and repression. I propose two possible mechanisms: (1) Chinese investors take cues from the political environment and will thus act more conservatively in the market prior to public holidays or (2) the government increases intervention to stabilize the stock market during these periods. I test this relationship using daily stock exchange data from Shanghai and Shenzhen. In addition, I corroborate the theoretical mechanism by testing whether there is similar conservatism before focal points on the dissident calendar. This research note contributes to our understanding of the Chinese investment market and raises general questions about the representativeness of the finance literature. In addition, this research speaks to the costs of authoritarianism and preserving social stability in these contexts.

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