Half a Century on the Concepts of Innateness and Instinct: Survey, Synthesis and Philosophical Implications

Abstract

This paper first surveys and criticizes the various attempts by students of behavior to define the concept of innateness. A new definition, based on these (especially that of Lorenz), and reformulable in terms of now classic notions in genetics and evolutionary theory, is then offered: A trait is innate if, and only if, it is canalized and such that any phenotype in the reaction norm which does not possess the trait is a morphose — hence maladapted — and such that all modifications do possess the trait. A narrower definition of innateness, based on the first definition, is suggested to delimit what is called “the Lorenzian notions of innateness” and to provide a framework within which to discuss the notion of a fixed action pattern. Evidence, from the recent literature, is adduced to show the existence and importance of such patterns — even for human behavior. In the final section, it is argued that a paradigm shift has indeed occurred and that although this scientific revolution has been accompanied by many of the irrational elements noted by the Kuhnian school of philosophy of science, the shift has in fact been made upon perfectly rational grounds. That this should be true of so controversial a field is strong evidence against the irrationalist thesis in philosophy of science.