Abstract
We experimentally study intention-based social influence from other group members on proposers and recipients in standard and modified Ultimatum and Impunity games. Standard games allow for bi-dimensional strategy vectors whereas they are uni-dimensional in modified games. The latter reveal more clearly intended fairness that should strengthen others influence. Groups are minimally identified by colors and social influence is based on information about median intention(s) in ones group. Social influence affects bi-dimensional Ultimatum bargaining significantly more than Impunity generosity suggesting that the latter is more immune to social influence, i.e. sharing triggered by intrinsic generosity concerns is less sensitive than sharing, confounded by strategic concerns. Altogether, social influence enhances conformity seeking and thereby efficiency, but its effect is strongly role dependent.
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