Abstract
Several philosophical issues in connection with computer simulations rely on the assumption that results of simulations are trustworthy. Examples of these include the debate on the experimental role of computer simulations (Parker in Synthese 169(3):483–496, 2009; Morrison in Philos Stud 143(1):33–57, 2009), the nature of computer data (Barberousse and Vorms, in: Durán, Arnold (eds) Computer simulations and the changing face of scientific experimentation, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Barcelona, 2013; Humphreys, in: Durán, Arnold (eds) Computer simulations and the changing face of scientific experimentation, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Barcelona, 2013), and the explanatory power of computer simulations (Krohs in Int Stud Philos Sci 22(3):277–292, 2008; Durán in Int Stud Philos Sci 31(1):27–45, 2017). The aim of this article is to show that these authors are right in assuming that results of computer simulations are to be trusted when computer simulations are reliable processes. After a short reconstruction of the problem of epistemic opacity, the article elaborates extensively on computational reliabilism, a specified form of process reliabilism with computer simulations located at the center. The article ends with a discussion of four sources for computational reliabilism, namely, verification and validation, robustness analysis for computer simulations, a history of (un)successful implementations, and the role of expert knowledge in simulations.
Highlights
In a recent dispute over the philosophical novelty of computer simulations, Hum‐ phreys (2009) argued in favor of four genuine philosophical issues that require the attention of philosophers, namely, epistemic opacity, the semantics of computer simulations, the temporal dynamics of computational processes and the distinction in principle/in practice
‘how does epistemic opacity affect the epis‐ temological treatment of computer simulations?’, ‘in the context of opacity, could it be correct to say that scientists are overemphasizing the success of simulations?’ (Frigg and Reiss 2009), and ‘is there a way to conceive of epistemic opacity coexist‐ ing with some form of knowledge?’ This article aims at addressing these questions and providing a qualitative answer to epistemic opacity in the context of computer simulations
This point has been recently criticized by Julian Newman, who argues that epistemic opacity is a non starter for the epistemological treatment of computer simulations
Summary
In a recent dispute over the philosophical novelty of computer simulations, Hum‐ phreys (2009) argued in favor of four genuine philosophical issues that require the attention of philosophers, namely, epistemic opacity, the semantics of computer simulations, the temporal dynamics of computational processes and the distinction in principle/in practice. To frame the issue within the current philosophical debate, consider the ques‐ tion of whether epistemic opacity is an unavoidable issue in scientific practice, and is the acceptance of the epistemic superiority of computers This point has been recently criticized by Julian Newman, who argues that epistemic opacity is a non starter for the epistemological treatment of computer simulations. Standard forms of abstraction, idealization and the like aim at neglecting specific aspects of the target system, while information hiding consists in hiding “details that are essential in a lower-level processing context but inessential in a software design and programming context” (Colburn and Shute 2007, 176) Understanding these claims in our context, it is possible to identify unavoidable degrees of opacity in standard software engineering practice that come with an agent being unable to relate a given computer program with its physical instantiation on the computer machine (i.e., information is hidden to the agent). The last section recapitulates the findings and advocates for further issues of genuine philosophical interest
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