GPS spoofing detection for the power grid network using a multireceiver hierarchical framework architecture

Abstract

In the future, the modernized power grid, or smart grid, will utilize devices called phasor measurement units (PMUs) to continuously monitor the power grid state in real time. These devices utilize GPS to synchronize the voltage and current phasor measurements across the continental network; however, because the civilian GPS signals are unencrypted, PMUs are susceptible to GPS spoofing attacks. We propose a spoofing detection algorithm using a wide-area, hierarchical architecture. In the network, each PMU transmits conditioned signal fragments containing the military P(Y) signal, which serves as an encrypted signature in the background of all authentic GPS signals. This signature is then verified among a subnetwork consisting of a select number of well-dispersed receivers. We subsequently compare representative signals generated for each subnetwork in order to detect coordinated attacks against the subnetwork receiver collection. Using real-world data recorded during a government-sponsored, live-sky spoofing event, we demonstrate that our algorithm successfully evaluates the authenticity of a widely dispersed receiver network.