Government Responsibility in The Management of Natural Resources for The Protection of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in The Balaesang Region

International law underwent a major shift when the second World War ended; the creation of the United Nations (UN) led to a system based upon human rights. The UN Charter, which affirmed support for equal rights and self-determination, was adopted in 1945, followed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948. A number of binding treaties were ratified in the years that followed, most notably the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 1966. This shift, together with the first explicit endorsement of self-determination, (defined as the freedom of a group of people to choose a political status and pursue development ) led to the demise of colonial powers dominating entire peoples and the creation of a number of new states. Indigenous peoples, effectively trapped within the borders laid down by their colonial oppressors, were largely left out of this. Indigenous peoples, broadly defined as tribal groups that have been somewhat engulfed by settler states, have often been left at a severe disadvantage by this subjugation. They make up about 5% of the world population but 15% of them exist in extreme poverty. The human rights of Indigenous peoples had long been treated as a domestic matter for the states in which their territory fell. This often had disastrous consequences, particularly in terms of their culture and socio-cultural human rights. Forcible attempts were made to assimilate Indigenous peoples in Canada, for example, through the state-sponsored residential school system, in which children were separated from their families, and housed in inhumane conditions. They were ‘educated’ as a means to stamping out Indigenous culture, whilst transferring the children onto the lower rungs of the economy. This practice continued for over a century and, along with other government policies, has been termed a cultural genocide. An international Indigenous rights system has developed during that time frame, however. There are now a number of international agreements and treaties that concern Indigenous peoples, most notably the UN’s Universal Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). Whilst this has brought necessary attention to the plight of Indigenous peoples, it is not regarded as a fix-all solution. General Assembly President Sheikha Haya Rashed Al Khalifa has warned that ‘even with this progress, Indigenous peoples still face marginalization, extreme poverty and other human rights violations. They are often dragged into conflicts and land disputes that threaten their way of life and very survival.’ This article argues that these clashes have, to an extent, undermined the protections of Indigenous rights, and whilst Indigenous peoples are now recognized by the international human rights regime, they continue to be marginalized. There are fundamental disagreements between several states, not least Canada, and the international Indigenous rights regime. Some of these are ideological, owing to the nature of Indigenous cultural rights themselves and to their uncomfortable fit within the international, ‘universal’ human rights regime that has been prominent since 1945. Other problems are more practical, stemming from the profound clashes between Indigenous cultural beliefs and the more Eurocentric values that tend to underpin modern, Western political and economic systems. A critical examination of the international Indigenous rights system is presented here, with Canada used as a case study. The background and development of the international Indigenous right system is outlined and explained, and its evident strengths and weaknesses briefly described. The article then examines ideological clashes between Western conceptions of human rights and Indigenous rights: self-determination, cultural, and land rights, as well as the collective nature of Indigenous rights. The practical incompatibilities between Indigenous peoples in Canada, and Canada as a sovereign settler state are then evaluated. This will point to the conclusion that the cause of Indigenous peoples has been only marginally advanced by the international Indigenous right system and that the future is not particularly promising.

This volume, a collection of essays by a variety of scholars in the field of indigenous rights, originates from the Irish Centre for Human Rights at the National University of Ireland in Galway. It highlights those instances in the work of international organizations where advances have been made concerning indigenous rights. It also devotes attention to the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, and to a number of thematic issues in the field. The human rights situations facing indigenous peoples in Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, India, Kenya, Mexico, Nicaragua, Nigeria and South Africa are dealt with in separate chapters. These surveys show a range of reactions to the multiple problems of discrimination, or lack of proper responses, as far as domestic legislation, national implementation of the laws, and national compliance with the applicable international standards are concerned.

8 | International Union Rights | 25/4 FOCUS | INDIGENOUS PEOPLES & UNIONS Litigating Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in Africa: The Impact of Convention 169 Thirty years after the adoption of ILO Convention No. 169 (C169), only twenty-three States have ratified it. Only one ratifying country is in Asia (Nepal) and one in Africa (Central African Republic). This sparse support is disappointing given that many more ratified its precursor, Convention No. 107: Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan in Asia, and Angola, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, and Tunisia in Africa. In replacing C107 with C169, the ILO was responding to the emergent indigenous peoples’ movement, which rejected C107 as founded on an out-dated integrationist approach. In so doing, C169 re-imagined indigenous peoples as communities deserving of special protections vis-à-vis the majority population and presented a new way of understanding these communities’ concerns. The principles enshrined in C169 — which formalised a more expansive view of the rights of indigenous peoples in international law — and the conceptual shift harkened by its adoption, have informed the way these issues have been subsequently framed and understood by the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and by regional human rights institutions. Although many of the concepts and terminology of international human rights law on indigenous peoples derives from the Conventions, much work remains in the realm of C169’s ratification and implementation. This article examines the lack of support for the Convention in Asia and Africa, and assesses the ways in which practitioners have sought to protect the rights of indigenous communities despite C169’s limited ratification. In particular, this article will focus on the experience of Minority Rights Group (MRG), a non-profit organisation working to secure the rights of ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities and indigenous peoples worldwide. MRG’s experience litigating land rights cases on behalf of indigenous and tribal communities in Africa shows that a more expansive view of the rights of indigenous peoples has made its way into the jurisprudence of the African Human Rights system. Although C169 has informed the way African human rights bodies have interpreted the rights of indigenous peoples under the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter), its narrow ratification base and the lack of meaningful implementation models in the countries that have ratified the Convention limit its utility from a strategic litigation perspective. States’ reticence to ratify C169 Although it is hard to know precisely why the majority of African and Asian States have chosen not to ratify C169, particular concerns were voiced in discussions at the ILO, as well as in discussions leading to the adoption of the UNDRIP. The most intractable sticking point involves an ongoing debate surrounding the applicability of the term ‘indigenous peoples’ in Asia and Africa1. In submissions during the C169 drafting sessions, China flatly denied that any indigenous populations lived in their country2. The Indian representative reiterated that, ‘the tribal peoples in India were not comparable in terms of their problems, interest and rights, to the indigenous populations of certain other countries. For this reason, attempts to set international standards on some of the complex and sensitive issues involved might prove to be counter-productive’3. Some governments particularly feared that use of the term ‘peoples’ instead of ‘populations’ could give rise to secessionist aspirations. The representative for India ‘felt that the Committee should carefully consider the impact that the use of “peoples” could have in countries beset with the problems of integration’4. Similar objections were raised to the use of the word ‘territories’ in relation to the ancestral lands of indigenous and tribal peoples. Notably, some of the countries that had ratified C107 simply clung to its integrationist approach. During the C169 drafting sessions, for example, the representative for Bangladesh stated that ‘the existing provisions of [C107] were sufficiently comprehensive. He expressed concern that any attempt to introduce radical changes in the focus and orientation of the Convention would have detrimental effects on territorial integrity and conflict with existing constitutions and legal systems of many countries, and could discourage many countries from ratifying it’5. While each country has its own historical, political, and social context that informs debates over indigeneity...

8 | International Union Rights | 25/4 FOCUS | INDIGENOUS PEOPLES & UNIONS Litigating Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in Africa: The Impact of Convention 169 Thirty years after the adoption of ILO Convention No. 169 (C169), only twenty-three States have ratified it. Only one ratifying country is in Asia (Nepal) and one in Africa (Central African Republic). This sparse support is disappointing given that many more ratified its precursor, Convention No. 107: Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan in Asia, and Angola, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, and Tunisia in Africa. In replacing C107 with C169, the ILO was responding to the emergent indigenous peoples’ movement, which rejected C107 as founded on an out-dated integrationist approach. In so doing, C169 re-imagined indigenous peoples as communities deserving of special protections vis-à-vis the majority population and presented a new way of understanding these communities’ concerns. The principles enshrined in C169 — which formalised a more expansive view of the rights of indigenous peoples in international law — and the conceptual shift harkened by its adoption, have informed the way these issues have been subsequently framed and understood by the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and by regional human rights institutions. Although many of the concepts and terminology of international human rights law on indigenous peoples derives from the Conventions, much work remains in the realm of C169’s ratification and implementation. This article examines the lack of support for the Convention in Asia and Africa, and assesses the ways in which practitioners have sought to protect the rights of indigenous communities despite C169’s limited ratification. In particular, this article will focus on the experience of Minority Rights Group (MRG), a non-profit organisation working to secure the rights of ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities and indigenous peoples worldwide. MRG’s experience litigating land rights cases on behalf of indigenous and tribal communities in Africa shows that a more expansive view of the rights of indigenous peoples has made its way into the jurisprudence of the African Human Rights system. Although C169 has informed the way African human rights bodies have interpreted the rights of indigenous peoples under the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter), its narrow ratification base and the lack of meaningful implementation models in the countries that have ratified the Convention limit its utility from a strategic litigation perspective. States’ reticence to ratify C169 Although it is hard to know precisely why the majority of African and Asian States have chosen not to ratify C169, particular concerns were voiced in discussions at the ILO, as well as in discussions leading to the adoption of the UNDRIP. The most intractable sticking point involves an ongoing debate surrounding the applicability of the term ‘indigenous peoples’ in Asia and Africa1. In submissions during the C169 drafting sessions, China flatly denied that any indigenous populations lived in their country2. The Indian representative reiterated that, ‘the tribal peoples in India were not comparable in terms of their problems, interest and rights, to the indigenous populations of certain other countries. For this reason, attempts to set international standards on some of the complex and sensitive issues involved might prove to be counter-productive’3. Some governments particularly feared that use of the term ‘peoples’ instead of ‘populations’ could give rise to secessionist aspirations. The representative for India ‘felt that the Committee should carefully consider the impact that the use of “peoples” could have in countries beset with the problems of integration’4. Similar objections were raised to the use of the word ‘territories’ in relation to the ancestral lands of indigenous and tribal peoples. Notably, some of the countries that had ratified C107 simply clung to its integrationist approach. During the C169 drafting sessions, for example, the representative for Bangladesh stated that ‘the existing provisions of [C107] were sufficiently comprehensive. He expressed concern that any attempt to introduce radical changes in the focus and orientation of the Convention would have detrimental effects on territorial integrity and conflict with existing constitutions and legal systems of many countries, and could discourage many countries from ratifying it’5. While each country has its own historical, political, and social context that informs debates over indigeneity...

Even though the principle of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) is soft law, the need to respect, protect and fulfil the rights to be informed and to be involved in development projects is strongly backed in international legal instruments including inter alia the ILO Convention 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal People in Independent Countries (1998) and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous and Tribal People (2007). These instruments do not only appear to be the most comprehensive and advanced international legal instruments that deal with indigenous peoples' rights in terms of the FPIC, but also signal an addition to the growing body of international human rights law that serves to ensure the realisation and protection of the substantive environmental and other human rights of indigenous people, particularly in the context of land grabbing activities that have the potential to negatively impact on their rights. Such rights include, for example, the rights to be informed and to participate in decision-making processes with respect to development projects, including land grabbing activities. This implies an obligation on states party to such international agreements to ensure that indigenous people are informed about and are actively involved in both the negotiation and the implementation of land grabbing deals. However, because the latter often takes place against the background of non-transparent transactions which are inimical to the rights and interests of indigenous people, one may wonder why the principle of FPIC is not applicable during land grabbing transactions. Focusing on Cameroon, this article examines instances of land grabbing in the country in order to support this hypothesis. This is done by focusing specifically on the application of the principle of FPIC. The arguments in the article are inspired by international law in which the application of the principle in the context of land grabbing serves not only to protect the rights and interests of indigenous people but is also conducive to fostering and reinforcing the land governance regime of host countries involved in such deals. To this end, the article concludes that because the principle embodies aspects of procedural rights such as the rights to information and participation, which are often conspicuously lacking during land grabbing contracts, its application in and during land grabbing might be useful to set the basis for the recognition, promotion, and enforcement of local communities' rights in Cameroon.

Introduction: The Constitution clearly provides recognition and respect for the existence of society customary law in Indonesia is regulated in Article 18B paragraph (2) and Article 28I paragraph (3) of the 1945 Constitution. However, how is the implementation in the islands such as Maluku Province which has unique characteristics such as cultural, social, religious culture and especially in the utilization of forest resources based on local wisdom that has been maintained for generations.Purposes of the Research: The purpose of this research is to analyze and explain how the state's recognition and respect for the rights of indigenous peoples to the use of forest resources in the constitution and secondly to analyze how the implementation of state control over forest resources is related to the rights of indigenous peoples in Maluku Province.Methods of the Research: This study uses two approaches, namely a legal approach which examines various legal foundations, both products of legislation and regulations related to exploitation of forest resources in islands and the second approach is a conceptual approach related to the problem under study.Results of the Research: The results show recognition and protection of indigenous peoples has been regulated in the 1945 Constitution and several sectoral laws. However, in practice, the rights of indigenous peoples over their forest resources often clash with the interests of the government in the name of development by granting various permits in the field of forest resources to corporations in the forestry sector, causing vertical conflicts between indigenous peoples and corporations in Maluku. as well as horizontal conflicts between state institutions in Indonesia. In addition, the criminalization and violence against indigenous peoples by law enforcement officers and violations of the rights of indigenous peoples by the state, especially the rights to control, manage and exploit forests, continue to this day. The government should enforce laws and development policies in Indonesia by immediately ratifying the draft law on the protection of the rights of indigenous and tribal peoples as an effort by the state to realize protection for every citizen and serve as a legal umbrella that is fair and non-discriminatory.

The principle of equilibrium is an ethical demand closely related to the communal mentality of customary law, encompassing moral, social, and legal values. Therefore, this research aimed to understand the application of equilibrium to the cosmological rights of indigenous and tribal people in implementing Pancasila values. Normative legal research was used with a statutory method to achieve a clear understanding of the issues discussed. The results showed that equilibrium served as a guide for creating a balance between rights and obligations realised concretely through legal and non-legal norms. Furthermore, the different rights owned by indigenous people were recognised and respected. In this context, the government needs to prioritise Pancasila values in development and pay attention to the cosmological rights of indigenous and tribal people. Customary law must address various legal issues faced by people in specific areas and uphold the fundamental rights.

The proposal to create a Northern Corridor that would allow for cross-country, multi-modal infrastructure development is an ambitious vision (Sulzenko and Fellows 2016; Standing Senate Committee 2017). This proposed infrastructure corridor would incorporate multiple uses, from pipelines to railways, roads, telecommunications, electricity infrastructure and more. Its geographic scale stretches continuously from coastal B.C. across Canada to the Atlantic coast, with spurs running northward to the Arctic Ocean through the Northwest Territories, Nunavut and via Manitoba to Hudson’s Bay. A critical foundation for its successful development will be the ability to appreciate and incorporate the rights of Indigenous peoples affected by the project (Wright 2020; Newman 2022). The goal of this research paper is to outline the law of Indigenous peoples’ land ownership rights, including proven and asserted title, Crown-Indigenous treaty relations and obligations and Indigenous land claims agreements, and to consider the implications for a large-scale infrastructure project like the Northern Corridor.1 The focus is on the legaland regulatory aspects of Indigenous peoples’ land rights within the non-Indigenous Canadian legal system.2 The research paper uses standard legal methods to assess the land ownership rights of Indigenous peoples, drawing on relevant constitutional and statutory provisions, leading cases and secondary literature. The paper proceeds with a brief overview of these distinct types of Indigenous land rights, then provides a more detailed account of the legal content of s. 35 constitutional Aboriginal title, historic and modern treaty rights. This includes discussion of government’s legal duty of consultation and accommodation, and the requirements for constitutionally justified limitation of these rights. Indigenous land ownership rights in reserve lands are also discussed. A series of case studies more fully illustrates the implications of these varied Indigenous land rights for a project like the Northern Corridor. Finally, the paper turns to the dynamic nature of Indigenous rights and the potential influence of the UNDRIP. The implications of Indigenous peoples’ land rights for the proposed Northern Corridor are extensive. While many of the legal obligations fall on the Crown, as represented by provincial, territorial and federal governments, industry proponents must also play a role. Project proponents engage directly with Indigenous land-rights holders and are crucial to the exchange of information, mitigation of project impacts and creation of benefits for Indigenous communities. Successful development of the Northern Corridor infrastructure project requires a partnered approach with affected Indigenous rights- holding communities. Portions of the proposed corridor traverse the traditional territories of Indigenous peoples over which Aboriginal title is claimed. Where Indigenous claimants demonstrate sufficient, exclusive use and occupation of the land prior to Crown claims of sovereignty, title will be established. The legal test for recognizing title is one that reflects both the common law and Aboriginal perspectives, and is sensitive to context. The geographic scope for successful Aboriginal title claims that overlap with the Northern Corridor is significant. Where Indigenous peoples hold title to the land, they are collectively entitled to exclusively enjoy the benefits of that land, and to decide on its uses. Governments or third parties seeking access to the land require consent from the title holders. In the period before title is established, governments authorizing projects like the Northern Corridor, that could negatively impact Aboriginal title, must consult with Indigenous peoples and, when appropriate, accommodate their interests. This is required to maintain the Honour of the Crown. While the legal duty falls on government, project proponents working directly with Indigenous peoples are an important part of the consultation and accommodation process. Governments do retain a legal ability to justifiably limit Aboriginal title. They can pursue projects in the public interest that are consistent with s. 35’s reconciliation purpose, if they meet the requirements of their unique obligations to and relationship with Aboriginal people (the fiduciary duty and Honour of the Crown). This means satisfying the procedural duty to consult and accommodate Aboriginal title holders, pursuing only limits on title that do not damage their long-term relationship with the land, as well as meeting a recently outlined requirement for proportionality. Proportionality means that limits on Aboriginal title must be necessary to achieve the public purpose and must be as minimal as possible, and that the overall public benefit must not be outweighed by negative impacts on title holders. Projects that go forward with participation and consent of Indigenous title holders will meet these requirements. There is also potential for the Northern Corridor to cross reserve lands. Where these remain subject to the Indian Act, one of the relevant statutory mechanisms for access must be used. These require consent from the band and federal government. For bands that have transitioned to management of their reserves under the First National Land Management Act (FNLMA), only consent of the band as set out in its Land Code is required. The Northern Corridor also crosses lands over which Indigenous people hold land rights under the historic “Numbered Treaties.” While the treaties appear to include formal surrenders of Aboriginal title (an interpretation that is contested), continued rights of use over traditional territories are critical elements of these constitutionally binding agreements. Although governments can “take up” surrendered lands for development, this right is subject to a duty to consult Indigenous parties and accommodate impacts on their treaty rights. Governments can justifiably infringe historic treaty rights. This can be done when a permissible objective is pursued in a way that meets government’s fiduciary duty and upholds the Honour of the Crown. The specific requirements can vary, but generally the test is more restrictive when non-commercial treaty rights are at stake and requires some form of priority to be given to these Aboriginal rights. The requirement for justification is triggered when treaty rights are infringed — when a group is deprived of a meaningful ability to exercise its treaty rights within its traditional territory. Recent developments suggest this threshold should be assessed looking to cumulative impacts and that a process for monitoring and addressing these is part of justified limits on these historic treaty rights. Finally, the Northern Corridor also intersects with lands covered by modern treaties. These agreements provide detailed guidance about the specific rights Indigenous parties enjoy, processes for consultation and co-management of the treaty lands as well as interactions between jurisdictional decisions under the treaty and by other levels of government. Courts have outlined a distinctive approach to the modern treaties that recognize their sophistication and the efforts to negotiate these modern governance frameworks to advance reconciliation. Courts would pay close attention to the relevant treaty terms and processes in any dispute over development of the Northern Corridor. Relatively minimal supervision of the modern treaty relationships should be expected from the courts, although the Honour of the Crown and the obligations it places on governments still apply. It is unclear whether justified infringements of modern treaty rights are possible, and whether a stricter constitutional standard would be required. Case studies of recent infrastructure and resource development projects show that while much of the law is clear, outstanding issues remain, and the practical application of the law can be challenging. The sufficiency of consultation can be in doubt on complex projects involving multiple Indigenous communities. Basic issues such as who to consult can emerge when there is overlap between traditional and Indian Act governance structures and both reserves and other land rights are involved. The applicability of Indigenous laws to traditional territories under claims of Aboriginal title and interactions between Indigenous law and jurisdiction and non-Indigenous law and government authority can also be unclear. Many modern projects proceed with the consent and participation of Indigenous peoples, for example, through benefit agreements. These agreements, because of their link to the underlying Aboriginal rights, can engage the Honour of the Crown and the duty to consult if subsequent developments negatively affect benefits under the agreements. In practice, meeting the legal obligations triggered by Indigenous land rights requires direct, good faith engagement with affected Indigenous communities. The best-case scenario is partnered development that proceeds with the consent of Indigenous rights holders. Current case law suggests that projects like the Northern Corridor might go ahead without full consensus, since there is no “veto” implicit in s. 35(1) Aboriginal rights. However, legal requirements for justified infringements, if possible, still require adequate consultation and accommodation of the rights of Indigenous peoples, and support only necessary, minimal limits on their rights. Overall benefits must outweigh negative impacts on Indigenous communities, and their ability to benefit directly from projects or be compensated for harms is generally part of justifying limits on their rights. On the ground, project proponents will be deeply involved in the relationship-building and engagement that is needed to support consensual development, or will meet the high bar for constitutional justification. Determining whether governments’ legal obligations ultimately have been met is done at a detailed, fact-specific level — not in the abstract. There are no leading cases that support constitutional justification of hypothetical, indeterminate public uses such as the proposed Northern Corridor. The law of Indigenous rights is constantly evolving. Over the lifespan of a project like the Northern Corridor, change would be certain. Canadian approval of the UNDRIP and recent federal and provincial legislation committing to bring Canadian law into compliance are important signals of future development. The UNDRIP embraces a model of Indigenous rights grounded in self-determination and its standard of “free, prior, informed consent” appears to reflect the ability of Indigenous peoples to make their own decisions about projects that impact their rights. The legal implications of the UNDRIP for s. 35 and Indigenous land rights in Canada remain to be seen. As with modern treaties and the FNLMA, it represents a resurgence in Indigenous peoples’ rights to play a direct role in governing their traditional lands and bringing their own laws to bear on developments that impact their lands and rights. Co-management and shared governance frameworks that integrate Indigenous rights holders will likely be key to successful future project development. For a proposal like the Northern Corridor, further study is required to fully appreciate the implications of these nascent developments and consider how they should be reflected in the project proposal.

During the last two decades processes of legal globalization have led to the increasing codification of the collective rights of indigenous peoples. In Latin America this shift towards ‘codifying culture’ began with a series of constitutional reforms during the 1990s which recognized a series of rights of indigenous people and the ratification by many states of the International Labour Organization's Convention 169 on the rights of indigenous and tribal peoples. For many, this regional ‘neoliberal multicultural’ turn (Hale, 2002, 2006) was not about recognizing rights as such, but rather heralded a series of governmental policies signalling limited acceptance of cultural diversity which ultimately facilitated transnational forms of capitalist accumulation. The limited gains of state-endorsed multiculturalism and the threats posed to indigenous livelihoods by the current commodities boom have encouraged a growing number of counter-hegemonic legal engagements, or legal globalization ‘from below’, which resort to ever more transnationalized legal pluralities (Santos & Rodríguez-Garavito, 2005). Indigenous people across Latin America continue to judicialize their protests, appealing to legal entitlements, including both ‘hard law’ (treaty and constitutional law) and ‘soft law’ (such as the internal norms of multilateral development institutions), in order to claim greater autonomy and protest against the effects of dominant patterns of economic development. Using Boaventura de Sousa Santos's heuristic device of the regulatory and emancipatory dimensions of law (Santos, 1998, 2002), in this article I examine the effects of legal globalization and the appropriation of legal instruments and discourses by indigenous people in post-war Guatemala. Specifically, I highlight the distinct legal frameworks, and conflicting notions of property, development, citizenship and democratic participation and voice at play in recent mobilizations against mining projects. The conclusions reflect on the possible effects of judicializing indigenous peoples’ political demands.

Even though the principle of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) is soft law, the need to respect, protect and fulfil the rights to be informed and to be involved in development projects is strongly backed in international legal instruments including inter alia the ILO Convention 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal People in Independent Countries (1998) and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous and Tribal People (2007). These instruments do not only appear to be the most comprehensive and advanced international legal instruments that deal with indigenous peoples' rights in terms of the FPIC, but also signal an addition to the growing body of international human rights law that serves to ensure the realisation and protection of the substantive environmental and other human rights of indigenous people, particularly in the context of land grabbing activities that have the potential to negatively impact on their rights. Such rights include, for example, the rights to be informed and to participate in decision-making processes with respect to development projects, including land grabbing activities. This implies an obligation on states party to such international agreements to ensure that indigenous people are informed about and are actively involved in both the negotiation and the implementation of land grabbing deals. However, because the latter often takes place against the background of non-transparent transactions which are inimical to the rights and interests of indigenous people, one may wonder why the principle of FPIC is not applicable during land grabbing transactions. Focusing on Cameroon, this article examines instances of land grabbing in the country in order to support this hypothesis. This is done by focusing specifically on the application of the principle of FPIC. The arguments in the article are inspired by international law in which the application of the principle in the context of land grabbing serves not only to protect the rights and interests of indigenous people but is also conducive to fostering and reinforcing the land governance regime of host countries involved in such deals. To this end, the article concludes that because the principle embodies aspects of procedural rights such as the rights to information and participation, which are often conspicuously lacking during land grabbing contracts, its application in and during land grabbing might be useful to set the basis for the recognition, promotion, and enforcement of local communities' rights in Cameroon.

Indigenous Homeland Security: A Proposed United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the International Law of First Contact

Natural resources are important for human beings to sustain life on earth. However, continuous use of natural resources by the human beings, had affected the earth. There is need to manage our natural resources to improve the sustainability of the natural resources. Women have always come to forward to conserve and protect natural resources because they are the primary users of natural resources traditionally as well as modern. In this paper, A scale has been developed and standardized that can be used to measure the role of farm women towards natural resource management activities. The scale was developed by using the technique of “Scale Product Method” which combines the Thurston’s technique of equal appearing interval scale for selection of the items and Likert’s technique of summated rating for ascertaining the response on the scale. A total of 78 Natural Resource Management (NRM) activities were selected. Based on Scale (median) value and Q value, 72 Natural Resource Management (NRM) was selected to measure the role of farm women towards natural resource management activities. The co-efficient of reliability was calculated by the Rulon’s formula i.e. 0.81 and the content validity was observed thoroughly. The reliability and validity of the scale indicate its consistency and precision of the results. This scale can be used to measure the role of farm women in natural resource management activities.

How to assess the issue of indigenous land rights in the face of man-m⁠a⁠d⁠e climate change and Amazon fires? How to classify the EU free trade agreement „Mercosur“ and relevant climate, environmental and indigenous rights? What are legal opportunities for indigenous people(s) on the international, inter-American and EU level, to prevent the loss of land and forests, and to protect themselves from climate change? On the basis of indigenous land and environmental rights in Brazil and reactions to the Amazon fires, environmental regulations of the "Mercosur Pact" as well as concerned human and indigenous rights are discussed. Further, this article deals with relevant inter-American law (individual indigenous land rights) and international law (collective land rights). Environmental and climate law provide legal and political options for indigenous people(s), for instance in Brasil. Negative impacts of climate actions on indigenous peoples, the competition between environmental protection areas and indigenous territories, the inclusion of indigenous knowledge in sustainable environmental protection and the allocation of Global Public Goods are discussed. There are various interactions between climate and biodiversity protection, human rights, indigenous peoples rights, and free trade between the EU and South America. While protecting forests as a carbon sink, negative environmental or social consequences must be avoided. Like trade agreements, environmental standards for the protection of the Brazilian Amazon rain forest should be enforceable. To reduce deforestation and to confine the effects of climate change, indigenous peoples rights have to be strengthened. The free, prior, and informed consent of indigenous peoples to projects that may affect their territories is essential. It requires effective, coordinated solutions to protect human rights and indigenous land rights, and it needs a sustainable preservation of climate and forests - nationally and internationally. A collapse of the Amazon forest ecosystem would have global climate effects. In Brazil, alternatives to deforestation and destruction are: strengthening the rule of law and agro-ecology, and to defend indigenous territories.

Ulayat land is a beschikkingsrecht which describe about the relationships between indigenous people and their lands. Indigenous people say that there is a religio-magis character in that relationships. An empirical point of view can be described that ulayat rights still decrease on their recognization. It caused by conflicts, between indigenous people and government (vertical conflict) or between indigenous people and private corporation including inter indigenous people (horizontal conflict). In the framework to handle conflicts about ulayat lands, the government has an ambivalent attitude. In one side, the government give ulayat lands recognization and indigenous people's rights but in the other side, he deny indigenous people's rights. It urged by dirty political culture. As a matter of fact, there is an constitutional assurance of indigenous people's rights. It needed a long effort in order to get a constitutional recognization of indigenous people's rights not only in a paper but also in practice, it can be justification of law to protect ulayat lands of indigenous people

This paper, focusing on a Botswanan case of Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM), illustrates how globalized norms in seeming competition nonetheless reveal a potential middle ground. In Botswana there have been conflicts between regimes of environmentalism and indigenous cultural rights. Environmental protectionism has been based on a concept of “pristine nature” which does not allow for human interaction. Thus, the more protected areas are designated, the more indigenous peoples' lands are claimed as nature reserves. This forces local peoples to abandon cultural practices such as hunting animals and gathering wild plants. In contrast, impelled by the ascention of human rights issues, advocacy groups for the unorganized fourth world and indigenous communities have been struggling to protect indigenous people's cultural rights, thereby giving prominence to human rights issues. NGO advocates for indigenous peoples as well as professionals involved with indigenous groups have found that indigenous people's practices are in fact not harmful to the ecosystem. Rather, their ethno-biological knowledge and customary activities contribute to balancing the local ecosystem. This means that conflicting guidelines can be harmonized in “buffer zones” around protected areas, and the buffering program that has resulted, that by CBNRM, has been widely accepted in Botswana and is likely applicable to other countries in which we find similar value competition.