Government Intervention, Political Promotion of SOE Executives and Corporate Over-investment

Abstract

This paper empirically examines the impact of political promotion of SOE executives on corporate over-investment and the moderating effect of government intervention and political promotion paths on corporate over-investment using non-financial state-owned listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares from 2014 to 2019 as the research sample. The results show that there is a difference between "internal promotion" and "external promotion" of SOE executives on corporate over-investment, and "external promotion" of SOE executives significantly increases the degree of corporate over-investment. Government intervention plays a moderating role in the effect of political promotion on over-investment. The findings of this paper not only reveal the main reasons for the differences in the incentives of political promotion of SOE executives, but also prove the adjustment mechanism of government intervention and the heterogeneity of political promotion paths; At the same time, it has certain reference value for improving the investment efficiency and incentive system of SOEs.