Abstract
This paper addresses a relatively neglected phenomenon in government budget setting – the processes by which budgets are agreed in governments where power is shared (coalitions) or attenuated (minority). These forms of government have been a matter of serious study by political scientists, but not by accountants. This study examines the phenomenon of budget setting in political coalitions and minority governments by drawing on the ideas of negotiated order (Strauss) and circuits of power (Clegg) and focussing on the life of the Scottish Parliament (1999–2009). It offers evidence of stability in the exercise of power in coalition governments and of the fragmentary nature of a negotiated social order in budget setting in minority government. More general observations on government budget setting are also made.
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