Coalition Congruence in India’s Federal System

Abstract

This paper will analyse coalition politics in India over the period of coalition and/or minority governments from 1989 to the present, from the points of view of institutionalization, congruence and decentralization. India’s federal, bicameral parliamentary democracy, which uses a single-member, simple-plurality (SMSP) or first-past-the-post electoral system, has seen since 1989, a series of coalition and/or minority governments, mainly minority coalitions until the present surplus majority coalition since 2014. A large number of Indian states—in a federal system that has become increasingly decentralized since the mid-1990s—have also experienced coalition politics. Three questions naturally arise: (1) have coalitions become institutionalized at the federal and state levels, as least as far as the core formateur parties are concerned, or do they keep varying with changes of partners? This is the institutionalization question. The paper will argue that some practices have become institutionlised at the federal level and to a lesser extent at the state level. (2) What is the degree of congruence between coalitions at the federal level and those in various states, given the major role played by single-state regional parties in India’s system? This is the congruence question. The paper will argue that congruence is very limited and partial given the role of regional parties but that two broad coalitions are emerging, one led by the BJP, the other by the Congress. (3) How has coalition politics interacted with Indian federalism’s degree of decentralization? This is the decentralization question. The paper will argue that coalition politics has contributed to the further decentralization of power due to the fact that the two major national parties need regional parties as coalition partners to be able to form governments at the federal level and to pass legislation in both houses of parliament.