Governance, Sentiment Analysis and IPO Underpricing

Abstract

Research Question/Issue: What is the relationship between governance, tone in language and underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) in Latin America. Research Findings/Insights: First, we find empirical evidence for the link between uncertainty in tone in the IPO prospectus and the level of underpricing. Second, we do not find that governance provisions at the country level explain IPO underpricing. Third, governance mechanisms at the firm level, such as board size and independence, are significant in explaining underpricing. Fourth, when interacting with uncertainty in tone, corporate governance variables at the firm level display stronger (board size) or weaker (board independence) marginal effects. Finally, we find lower levels of underpricing for family firms compared to non-family firms. Theoretical/Academic Implications: Bigger boards seem to lead to greater underpricing while more independent boards mitigate it. This finding stresses the relevance of functional convergence in regions with weak institutions. Our results also suggest that tone in communications matter more for underpricing than governance. We argue that this could be due to the minimum corporate governance provisions at the firm level that firms need to meet before going public. Practitioner/Policy Implications: Our results suggest that tone in firm communications is relevant for market valuation. In the context of family firms, we show that reputation effect is priced by the market valuation of the IPO.