God and theoretical entities: Their cognitive status

Abstract

In this paper I shall be discussing three views concerning the cognitive status of theoretical entities in scientific theory, and three parallel views concerning the cognitive status of God in religious discourse. My aim will be to clarify the differences between the three views in scientific theory, so as to draw attention to parallel conclusions about religious discourse. (It is not my aim here to defend any one view either in scientific theory or in religious discourse.) I shall call weak scientific realism (WSR) the view that theoretical terms in science, like "electron," denote an entity which is real, just as chairs and tables are real, strong scientific realism (SSR), the view that theoretical terms denote the only real objects tables and chairs not being real on this view; and scientific instrumentalism (SI), the view that theoretical terms do not denote at all or that the question as to what theoretical terms denote does not arise. (For SI, theoretical terms are mere "symbolic devices" that enable us to make predictions in our common-sense perceptual framework.) In discussing the cognitive status of God in religious language (RL) it is possible to distinguish three corresponding views: weak theological realism (WTR), which maintains that "God" in RL denotes (or purports to denote) a real entity, while allowing that other entities exist as well; strong theological realism (STR) or pantheism, which says that God rather than anything else exists; and theological instrumentalism (TI), which maintains that "God" does not purport to denote at all, but that RL as a "symbolic device" is an "effective technique" for achieving certain goals, such as the motivating of morality, expression of deep emotions about the world, and the like. Philosophers have argued extensively the merits of the competing views in philosophy of science. In turn the debate has given rise to serious doubts about the meaningfulness of the distinctions involved. In what is perhaps the classic statement of the position, Ernest Nagel, in The Structure of Science goes so far as to argue that there is no substantive difference at all between what I have called WSR and SI.1 He claims that they are merely different "preferred modes of