Abstract
Spoofing attacks are one of the severest threats for global navigation satellite systems (GNSSs). This kind of attack can damage the navigation systems of unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) and other unmanned vehicles (UVs), which are highly dependent on GNSSs. A novel method for GNSS spoofing detection based on a coupled visual/inertial/GNSS positioning algorithm is proposed in this paper. Visual inertial odometry (VIO) has high accuracy for state estimation in the short term and is a good supplement for GNSSs. Coupled VIO/GNSS navigation systems are, unfortunately, also vulnerable when the GNSS is subject to spoofing attacks. The method proposed in this article involves monitoring the deviation between the VIO and GNSS under an optimization framework. A modified Chi-square test triggers the spoofing alarm when the detection factors become abnormal. After spoofing detection, the optimal estimation algorithm is modified to prevent it being deceived by the spoofed GNSS data and to enable it to carry on positioning. The performance of the proposed spoofing detection method is evaluated through a real-world visual/inertial/GNSS dataset and a real GNSS spoofing attack experiment. The results indicate that the proposed method works well even when the deviation caused by spoofing is small, which proves the efficiency of the method.
Highlights
Global navigation satellite systems (GNSSs) are some of the most important absolute positioning infrastructures, especially for unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) and other unmanned vehicles (UVs)
One hundred repetitions of the positioning estimation with these three kinds of spoofed Global Positioning System (GPS) positioning results were arranged, and all of the results indicated similar conclusions for the efficiency of the inducing spoofing detection method
GNSS spoofing has been proven to be one of the most dangerous threats to navigation systems. If they are unaware of the existence of GNSS spoofing interference, coupled navigation systems will be corrupted by the damage caused by spoofed GNSS data
Summary
Global navigation satellite systems (GNSSs) are some of the most important absolute positioning infrastructures, especially for unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) and other unmanned vehicles (UVs). The third kind of spoofing detection method is based on utilizing supplementary measurements from other navigation or positioning sensors of the system. A novel spoofing detection method using visual/inertial estimations as supplementary measurements is proposed, with the spoofing detection factor calculated by residuals and the error covariance matrix; 2. The experiments for the proposed spoofing detection method and the modified coupled positioning algorithm were conducted both with a dataset and real GNSS spoofing scenarios. The GNSS receiver uses the wrong pseudo-range measurements to calculate incorrect positions and clock errors as follow: PsGpNooSfS,k δtrs,pkoo f. In spoofing interference circumstances, if the GNSS receiver locks the spoofing signals and the spoofing error ςs from Equation (10) has been involved in the output pskpoo f , the final estimation of the coupled visual/IMU/GNSS navigation system is gradually induced to deviate from the real position to the spoofed position.
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