Abstract

Falsifying Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) data with a simulator or with a fake receiver can have a significant economic or safety impact in many transportation applications where Position, Velocity and Time (PVT) are used to enforce a regulation. In this context, the authentication of the source of the PVT data (i.e., the GNSS receiver) is a requirement since data faking can become a serious threat. Receiver fingerprinting techniques represent possible countermeasures to verify the authenticity of a GNSS receiver and of its data. Herein, the potential of clock-derived metrics for GNSS receiver fingerprinting is investigated, and a filter approach is implemented for feature selection. Novel experimental results show that three intrinsic features are sufficient to identify a receiver. Moreover, the adopted technique is time effective as data blocks of about 40 min are sufficient to produce stable features for fingerprinting.

Highlights

  • Electronic device fingerprinting is “the process of gathering device information to generate device-specific signatures” [1]

  • The stability of the features with respect to environmental changes: in this respect, features obtained from the three antenna locations have been compared; the score associated with the different feature subsets for a fixed data segment duration of 1 h

  • The stability of the candidate features to environmental changes is analyzed in Figure 10 where two receivers are considered as an example

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Summary

Introduction

Electronic device fingerprinting is “the process of gathering device information to generate device-specific signatures” [1]. These signatures are used to identify individual devices or specific device models and introduce an additional layer of security in applications requiring data from a trusted source. Similar to wireless devices in a network, GNSS receivers are used as data providers in several applications [11,12,13,14]. Position is obtained using a GNSS receiver that acts as a data provider for the AIS. GNSS data can be intercepted, and a genuine GNSS receiver

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