Global Framework Agreements in Context: UK and US

Abstract

FOCUS □ GLOBALFRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS Global Framework Agreements in Context: UK and US Although the question of legal status has perhaps not been givenkeen considerationon thetrade union side, itcannot be assumed that these agreements are notlegally enforceableinthe countrieswhere theyare concluded KDEWING isProfessor of Public Law atKings' College, London On work GMB 11December signed agreement a ground 2008, with breaking Uni security and global British giantG4S. frameunion GMBsigned a ground breaking global frameworkagreement withsecurity giantG4S. Thiswas theculmination ofa longcampaign which hadbeenconducted ona number offronts, andina number ofcountries. Thecampaign itself would be the subjectof a superbPhD thesis, addressing questions likethetrade unionresponse toglobalisation, theeffectiveness ofcorporate campaignstosecurecertain trade uniongoals,andthe importance oftheOECDGuidelines inMultinational Enterprises, andinthiscase thecreative interventionoftheUK contact point. Forpresent purposes, however, theagreement isinteresting for another reason, namely theclause itcontains inrelation toitslegalstatus. Unusually, theagreement states that ťit must be appliedwithintheframework oflawsandregulations that apply ineachcountry' wherethecompany operates, and 'that no partoftheagreement is legally enforceable ,either bytheparties orbyanythird party, or inanywaychanges oramendsanyindividual G4S employee's terms andconditions'. Thiswas probablystrictly unnecessary in the specific context ofUKlaw,wherecollective agreements arepresumed nottobe legally enforceable. Thisis a presumption thathas itsorigins in the commonlaw,and is nowtobe foundinstatute, though itis possiblethat theG4Sagreement falls outsidethescope ofthestatutory definition ofa collective agreement, and thatthecommonlaw position issufficiently uncertain, so as tojustify an expressterm ofthiskind. The inclusion ofthisterm in theG4S/UNI/GMB agreement isnevertheless unusual, andraises questionsaboutthelegalstatusofglobalframework agreements generally. Thisis notto saythatitis unique.The Falck/Uni agreement, forexample statesthatit is to be governedby the law of Denmark, though I understand that thisdoes not necessarilymean that it is legally binding. Apparently italldependsonwhether theterms of theagreement giverisetoissuesthat arecapable ofenforcement bya court. Itis also thecase that theFalck/Uni agreement is atypical inthesensethat itis principally about establishing a company councilon a worldwide basiswithnationalrepresentatives. Unlikemost agreements, itis notaboutcommitting thecompanytospecific substantive standards inallofits globaloperations, standards whichusuallymean compliancewiththe fourcore ILO principles (though ofcoursesomeagreements do go some waybeyondthis). Mostagreements arethuscharacterised bytheir uncertain legalstatus. Although thequestionof legalstatus hasperhaps notbeengivenkeenconsideration on thetradeunionside,I haveargued before that itcannot be assumedthat theseagreements arenotlegally enforceable inthecountries wherethey areconcluded.1 Muchwilldependon thelaw and practice ofthe19 orso countries in whichthevariousagreements havebeensigned, the(oftenhigh)level of solemnity aroundthe process,as wellas theintention oftheparties so faras itcanbe divined. Butitcannot be assumedthat theposition isthe samein all countries, orthatall agreements will havethesamelegalstatus evenwithin thesame country. Muchmaydependon thecontent ofthe agreement orthecontext within which itwasnegotiated . Where, for example, anagreement wasnegotiatedundertheumbrella ofa EuropeanWorks Council, itmaybe difficult todenyitlegaleffects ifall other EWCagreements inthejurisdiction in questionarelegally binding. The muchneglectedquestionoflegal enforceability ofGFAsisaddressed inanexcellent article bySarahColemanintheColumbia HumanRights Law Review.2 Colemanconsidersthisquestion through thelonglensofUS federal contract law, and examinestheextentto whichtheseagreements couldbe enforced intheUScourts. Indoing so,shedrawshelpful parallels between GFAsand employer neutrality agreements during union recognition drives. ColemanarguesthatGFAsare contracts that couldbe enforced intheUnited States federal courts as a result oftheLaborManagement Relations Act 1947,section 301.Thisallowsfor theenforcement ofcontractual agreements betweenmanagement andlabor, whicharenototherwise enforceable in theNationalLaborRelations Board.As I understandtheargument , GFAswouldnotbe enforceable underthelatter, butwouldbe enforceable contracts undersection301. Thisis an argument that wouldhavea particular resonance for the agreementconcluded betweenAmerican bananagiant Chiquita andthe IUFin2001,whichone recent study hassuggested is stilltheonlyGFAnegotiated bya US company .Buteveniflimited towhatis so fara singleagreement , Coleman's claimsarenevertheless highly significant, particularly in view ofrecent allegationsabout violationsofworkers'fundamental rights inGuatamala identified bytheITUC and BananaLink. According to theITUC in April2010,workers belonging tosixunionsaffiliated toUNSITRAGUA complained aboutworking conditions ina Chiquita subsidiary. Thiswassaidtohavebeenmet with 'a flat refusal to complywiththelaws ofthecountry and the most fundamental workers' rights, COBIGUA-CHIQUITAhas insinuated thatitwillclose downthe plantations ifitsemployees do notcontinue workINTERNATIONAL union rights Page 10Volume 18Issue 2201 1 FOCUS □ GLOBALFRAMEWORK AGREEMENTS ing, thereby totally violating their labourandtrade unionrights'.3 There is,however, another dimension tothis issue raised byColeman for whichI hadnotbargained, andwhichgoes wellbeyondtheChiquita agreement . Apart from thequestionoftheagreements beingenforced inthecourts ofthecountry where they werenegotiated, thisis theintriguing questionofwhether GFAscould be enforced in the courts ofa country inwhichthey aredesignedto apply;andnotatthesuitofone oftheparties to theagreement, butbyitsnational affiliate. The issuearisesin particular in relation to the conduct ofEuropeanand other multinationals in theUSA.4 Colemanraisesthepossibility that a US unionaffiliate ofa GUFcouldbring a claimunder section 301against a multinational trading inthe USAontheground that 'thebusiness they conduct intheUnited States shouldtypically be sufficient togrant courts theright toheardisputes concerningagreements thecorporation entered intowith U.S.plaintiffs' (p 619). Thiswouldbe particularly relevant incontext of thefreedom ofassociationprovisions ofagreements whicharearguably de facto neutrality provisions , as inthecaseoftheG4Sagreement which provides that ■ 'Theparties commit toworkwiththeir national affiliates andmanagers inorder to enablefreedom ofassociation tobe exercised ina...