Glass ceiling or glass cliff: an examination of the role of female board members on market performance in Poland

Abstract

ABSTRACT We examine gender bias related to the effect of women in executive management leadership. Specifically, we examine when women are recruited to executive positions and follow companies’ market performance before and after their appointment. Our study is conceptually situated within the field of queuing theory, suggesting certain patterns of labour market queuing behaviour according to race, gender, and class. We formulate two hypotheses: (1) the presence of female executives is associated with lower firm value; and (2) companies with female-centric executive boards are valued lower by investors than companies with male-centric boards. We test these hypotheses employing panel data, using a unique sample of 159 companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange in the years 2006–2015, with hand-collected data on the number of female directors on executive boards. Our results suggest that market queuing behaviour is evident in the case of Poland. Men are more often hired in executive roles than women, whereas females are more likely to be appointed to executive boards in firms which are performing poorly. Moreover, higher participation of women in executive positions is associated with resulting lower value in the long run. According to our interpretation, isomorphism and gender bias diffuse through the reproduction and valuation of capitalist markets.