General William E. DePuy: Preparing the Army for Modern War (review)

Abstract

Reviewed by: General William E. DePuy: Preparing the Army for Modern War Peter Maslowski General William E. DePuy: Preparing the Army for Modern War. By Henry G. Gole. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2008. ISBN 978-0-8131-2500-8. Maps. Illustrations. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xviii, 364. $35.00. William E. DePuy hardly ranks among the nation's best-known generals and yet, according to Gole's biography, he ultimately had more influence on the Army than did many better-known soldiers. A 1941 ROTC graduate, DePuy's long and varied career began in Europe during World War II, where he commanded a battalion in the 90th Division and then became the division G-3; as with so many officers of his generation, the "lessons" he learned during that war informed his thinking for more than thirty years. After a stint with the CIA during the Korean War (his activities remain classified), he commanded a battalion and then a Battle Group in Germany; spent three years in the Office of the Army Chief of Staff; became Director of Special Warfare; and served as Director of Plans and Programs on the Army Staff. During the Vietnam War he was one of General William C. Westmoreland's confidants, first as MACV's operations officer and then as commander of the 1st Infantry Division. Upon returning to the U.S. in 1967 DePuy served as the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities before becoming the Army's Assistant Vice Chief of Staff (AVICE), a controversial position created in 1967 and abolished seven years later. As the AVICE, DePuy helped to orchestrate a reorganization that abolished the cumbersome Continental Army Command and replaced it with two new organizations, Forces Command (FORSCOM) and Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The capstone of DePuy's career came as TRADOC's first commander, when he did much to "re-professionalize" the Army and catapult it out of its post-Vietnam doldrums. By the time he retired in 1977, "A revolution in training was under way; combat developments had been rationalized; a doctrine was in place; the creative energy of the Army was being tapped" (p. 266). This revitalized Army quickly won the First Gulf War, which Gole alleges was especially satisfying because "Americans prefer their wars to be short, decisive, and—of course—victorious" (p. 294). Evidently this differentiates Americans from those benighted "Others" who prefer their wars to be long, indecisive, and—of course—defeats. DePuy was a contentious figure, beloved by some but despised and feared by others. His acolytes--Gole often quotes them to excess--considered him energetic, intelligent, and decisive, a preeminent soldier-scholar who was both a fighting general and a dedicated teacher and mentor. Detractors reviled him as abrasive, ruthless, and arrogant, a bullying bantam rooster (DePuy was a very small man). Although the author does not hide the general's flaws, he perhaps over-extols the general's virtues while understating his less than appealing traits. [End Page 689] An important key in writing a biography is to provide context by setting an individual's life within a broader historical framework. In some places Gole does this quite well; the World War II chapters are especially fine in this regard, as is the chapter about the AVICE post, which reveals a great deal about the contemporary strains in civil-military relations and the Army's vicious in-fighting. But in other chapters, such as those covering Vietnam, this book misses opportunities to probe more profoundly into the subject. As just one example, based on his World War II experience DePuy always believed that "Killing comes from heavy firepower" (p. 47). Although Gole writes as if DePuy's adulation of firepower was unique, almost every officer who learned his craft during World War II worshipped the Goddess Firepower. Why did so few professionals understand that each war is unique, that what worked in World War II or Korea might not be equally useful in Vietnam? Gole writes, apparently without noticing the contradiction, that when DePuy's command of the 1st Division ended he had dominated the battlefield with mobility and firepower—and yet "the enemy continued to decide when to...