Abstract
Francesco Berto has recently written “The Godel Paradox and Wittgenstein's Reasons,” about a paradox first formulated by Graham Priest in 1971. The major reason for disagreeing with Berto's conclusions concerns his elucidation of Wittgenstein's understanding of Godel's theorems. Seemingly, Wittgenstein was some kind of proto-paraconsistentist. Priest himself has also, though in a different way, tried to tar Wittgenstein with the same brush. But the resolution of other paradoxes is intimately linked with the resolution of the Godel Paradox, and with understanding Wittgenstein's views of Godel's theorems. So this paper discusses some other paradoxes before looking at Wittgenstein's relevant views.
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