Bertrand Russell's theory of judgment

Abstract

Bertrand Russell proposed his multiple relation theory of judgment in 1910 and abandoned it some time before 1918. It is often maintained that one of the major disagreements between the early Russell and Wittgenstein was over this theory of judgment, and that an under standing of this disagreement is an aid in the understanding of Witt genstein's views concerning the nature of representation and the place of logic with respect to the rest of language. Wittgenstein was an early critic of Russell's multiple relation theory of judgment and ultimately convinced Russell that the theory was inadequate. Russell criticized the theory in 1918 and replaced it with a new theory in 1919. Since then, several other authors have criticized the multiple relation theory, often taking Wittgenstein's cryptic comments on the matter as their starting point.1 Unfortunately, these criticisms have been inadequate. Authors have been quick to find something wrong with the multiple relation theory of judgment so as to go on to some new theory. Russell himself led the way in this with his own discussion in 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism' (1918) and 'On Propositions' (1919) (both in [13]). The criticisms put forward often tend to ignore the possibilities of the multiple relation theory and thus disguise what was at the heart of Wittgenstein's rejection of the theory. Rather than discuss all the various criticisms separately, I will outline what I take to be the major criticisms of the theory and will discuss these criticisms, together with Russell's modifications of the theory which were intended to handle some of the problems raised. In doing this I hope to make clear which objections have the most force and to highlight the presuppositions behind the views that reject the multiple relation theory.