Game-Theoretic Formulations of Interaction Between Dynamic Traffic Control and Dynamic Traffic Assignment

Abstract

The dynamic traffic control problem and the dynamic traffic assignment problem are integrated as a noncooperative game between a traffic authority and highway users. The objective of the combined control-assignment problem is to find a mutually consistent dynamic system-optimal signal setting and dynamic user-optimal traffic flow. The combined control-assignment problem is first formulated as a one-level Cournot game: the traffic authority and the users choose their strategies simultaneously. The combined control-assignment problem is subsequently formulated as a bi-level Stackelberg game. The traffic authority is the leader; it determines the signal settings in anticipation of the users’ reactions. The users are followers who choose their routes after the signal settings have been determined. Finally, the system-optimal control-assignment problem is formulated as a Monopoly game. The sole player—the traffic authority—determines both signal settings and traffic flows to achieve a dynamic system-optimal solution. A numerical example is provided to illustrate the equilibria of the games.