Abstract
Summary With the increasing penetration of unregulated solar energy, a load service entity (LSE) can exert an externality cost to guide the charging behaviors of electric vehicle (EV) users and level the Duck Chart. This paper introduces a dynamic Stackelberg game model between LSE and EV users to analyze consumer behavior, and a complete information static game model to help LSEs increase profits by gaining share of the EV market. These dynamic and static game models are incorporated into a novel theoretic algorithm with mixed integer programming. A case study shows that the models and the proposed algorithm can level the Duck Chart and guarantee an LSE's share of the EV market. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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