Abstract

Mobile CrowdSensing (MCS) is an emerging paradigm in the distributed acquisition of smart city and Internet of Things (IoT) data. MCS requires large number of users to enable access to the built-in sensors in their mobile devices and share sensed data to ensure high value and high veracity of big sensed data. Improving user participation in MCS campaigns requires to boost users effectively, which is a key concern for the success of MCS platforms. As MCS builds on non-dedicated sensors, data trustworthiness cannot be guaranteed as every user attains an individual strategy to benefit from participation. At the same time, MCS platforms endeavor to acquire highly dependable crowd-sensed data at lower cost. This phenomenon introduces a game between users that form the participant pool, as well as between the participant pool and the MCS platform. Research on various game theoretic approaches aims to provide a stable solution to this problem. This article presents a comprehensive review of different game theoretic solutions that address the following issues in MCS such as sensing cost, quality of data, optimal price determination between data requesters and providers, and incentives. We propose a taxonomy of game theory-based solutions for MCS platforms in which problems are mainly formulated based on Stackelberg, Bayesian and Evolutionary games. We present the methods used by each game to reach an equilibrium where the solution for the problem ensures that every participant of the game is satisfied with their utility with no requirement of change in their strategies. The initial criterion to categorize the game theoretic solutions for MCS is based on co-operation and information available among participants whereas a participant could be either a requester or provider. Following a thorough qualitative comparison of the surveyed approaches, we provide insights concerning open areas and possible directions in this active field of research.

Highlights

  • With the massive deployment and wide adoption of the Internet of Things (IoT), the number of connected devices is tremendously increasing

  • Known as Mobile CrowdSensing (MCS), this process is envisioned to be an integral component of IoT systems [3,4]

  • We review various game theoretical methods applied in MCS that help to reach an equilibrium in a competition for gaining higher utility between service requester and service provider

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Summary

Introduction

With the massive deployment and wide adoption of the Internet of Things (IoT), the number of connected devices is tremendously increasing. In MCS campaigns, sensed data is collected from various locations through built-in sensors of the mobile devices by either implicitly (opportunistic) or explicitly (participatory) recruiting users (see Figure 1). Vamsi et al [24] were successful in delivering power to battery less temperature and camera sensors using Wi-Fi signals This might extremely reduce the cost of sensing and facilitates data collection process by encouraging more number of users to participate in sensing campaigns without worry of battery. The profit can apply in the form of maximizing the score, the reputation or the benefits obtained from users In this survey, we review various game theoretical methods applied in MCS that help to reach an equilibrium in a competition for gaining higher utility between service requester and service provider.

Background and Challenges in Mobile Crowdsensing
Privacy and Security
Quality of Data
Trustworthiness
Energy
Incentives
Agent-Based Strategies
Presentation of Common Game Theory Models
Co-Operative and Non-Co-Operative Games
Perfect and Imperfect Information Games
Complete and Incomplete Information Games
Evolutionary Games
Static and Dynamic Games
Zero Sum and Non Zero-Sum Games
Game Theory in MCS
Co-Operative Games in MCS
Co-Operative Games in MCS with Complete Information
Co-Operative Games in MCS with Incomplete Information
Non-Co-Operative Games in MCS
Non-Co-Operative Games in MCS with Complete Information
Non-Co-Operative Games in MCS with Incomplete Information
Open Research Areas
Nash Equilibrium
Stackelberg Game
Co-Operative Games
Non-Cooperative Games
Findings
Conclusion and Discussion

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