Game Analysis on the Problem of the Pollutant Emissions in Chinese Neighboring Province

Abstract

With the continuous development of Chinese economy, the accompanying environmental problems have become a matter of great concern. Due to the spatial connection of neigh-boring provinces in China, pollution from one province can easily be discharged into the jurisdiction of the other province, which will inevitably cause interest damage of the later province. China's provincial governments have limited jurisdictional areas, the game exists between different provincial governments due to different interest demands. This paper analyzed the conflict of interests between local governments in Chinese neighboring prov-inces due to the emission problem, constructed a game model, analyzed the impact of the cost of pollutant treatment and economic compensation for pollutants on the emission de-cision made by neighboring provincial governments, and propose reference suggestions for Chinese neighboring provincial governments to deal with the pollution emission problem by combining the results of game analysis. The results of the study show that the two sides of the game can reach a synthetic win-win decision when the right to discharge is clear.