Abstract

The global electricity supply from non-hydro renewable energies, such as wind and solar, has being growing at a high rate, and it is expected that this trend persists. In China, Wind power is one of the most mature renewable energy technologies and it is possible to be utilized in large-scale. However, in the long run, the malicious competition will break the rule of the monopoly wind power market under control of electricity utilities in China and prevent the development of Chinese wind power. Reasonable competition of the investment market is a key to promote healthy development of the wind power industries in China. Based on game theory, this paper investigates competitive behavior of the wind-farm investment companies. The competition mechanism and malicious competition behavior of the investment market of the non-asymmetric enterprisers, and the wind-farm investment market are discussed by the Stacklberg model and the Cournot-Nash model, respectively, and moreover, the theoretic analysises are verified to be effective by an example. Furthermore, some policy advices are put forwards to the Chinese wind power investment market.

Highlights

  • Availability of energy is a key element to achieve the interrelated economic, social and environmental goals of sustainable development in modern human society

  • About 84% of the total energy consumption is based on non-renewable forms of energies today (OECD/IEA, 2007)

  • Chinese government has increased the input on wind energy development over the recent years

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Summary

Introduction

Availability of energy is a key element to achieve the interrelated economic, social and environmental goals of sustainable development in modern human society. The gases from the burning of fossil fuels contribute to global climate change and local pollution, and the dependence on oil and gas raises concerns about supply security For these reasons, countries seek renewable sources of energy for generating electricity. Renewable energy in China continues to play an increasingly important and strategic role in the country's energy development. China has a large area with long coastline, so its wind energy resource has tremendous development potential. In order to barrier other to entry, they do not hesitate to sacrifice their own interests Those behaviors have prevented emitters such as top quality private or foreign enterprises from entering the downstream market of wind power, this behavior wasted resources seriously. A numerical example is given at last

The Stackelberg Model
Some Assumptions
A Maximum Profit Model of the Leader and the Stackelberg Price
A Extended Model of Stackelberg Game
The Cournot-Nash Game
Cournot Nash Model
Numerical Examples
Findings
Conclusion

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