Abstract

The behavior choice between the social emergency rescue rules makers (government and its important participant enterprises) has a great influence on the social emergency rescue activities. So this paper makes an in-depth analysis on the behavior choice between government and enterprises in the social emergency rescue activities. We analyses the actions and motivations between government and enterprises through constructing the static and dynamic game model between government and enterprises in the emergency management technology innovation. Finally, the corresponding suggestions are proposed.

Highlights

  • At present, with the deepening of economic globalization and international cooperation, the emergencies are becoming more frequent, complex and international, which results in greater loss and wider scope of influence

  • If the enterprise does not carry out the construction behavior, the outdated technology and low rescue rate of technical products providing the social rescue professionals will cause that the crisis event emergency management ability is low

  • If the government's support cost C is reduced, the revenue curve AB of the government’s active support for enterprises to implement the construction behavior will shift upward, and the equilibrium point X will shift to the left, which indicates if the support cost is reduced, the government's active support revenue will increase

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Summary

INTRODUCTION

With the deepening of economic globalization and international cooperation, the emergencies are becoming more frequent, complex and international, which results in greater loss and wider scope of influence It poses a serious challenge for the government to strengthen its emergency management capacity. Many emergency management experts and scholars at home and abroad pay attention to the innovation of social emergency rescue technology. Huang et al carried out in-depth research on the construction of the scientific and technological support system of emergency management in Hubei Province [14]. Lu proposed that Guangdong should promote the scientific and technological innovation of emergency management to strengthen the VOLUME XX, 2017. This paper uses the game theory to carry out the research on the behavior selection of government and enterprise in the construction of social emergency rescue system.

THE STATIC GAME ANALYSIS OF BEHAVIOR CHOICE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND ENTERPRISE
THE DYNAMIC EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT AND ENTERPRISE BEHAVIOR CHOICE
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

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