Abstract

Keywords: Reverse logistics; Waste household appliances; Static game; Dynamic game. Abstract. This paper uses game theory to analyze the behavior of government and enterprises in the Reverse Logistics (RL) of Waste Household Appliances (WHA). A static game model and a dynamic game model are established to study respectively the periods of establishing and operating the Reverse Logistics System (RLS). We find that (1)enterprises will establish the RLS when government can levy heavy fine on those not establishing the RLS and when enterprises make profits from establishing; (2)enterprises will operate the RLS actively when government subsidize them much. Then we discuss accordingly the strategies government should adopt in the RL of WHA. This paper contributes to the theoretical analysis and policy practices of reverse logistics of waste household appliances from the perspective of game theory.

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