Abstract
Abstract This chapter examines the history of a certain kind of argument in the philosophy of mind, which stretches from Plato to the medieval period. According to this style of argument, we can establish the nature of the mind by thinking about the nature of its object. Thus, from the fact that the mind grasps propositions that are universal in scope and necessary in modality, we can rule out that the mind is made of a physical organ, which would “particularize” the content of its thoughts. It will be shown how this sort of assumption underlies arguments for the incorporeality of mind in several philosophers of the Islamic world, especially Averroes and Avicenna, and then shown how the affinity argument was rejected by thinkers who came after Avicenna and arguably defended intuitions much closer to those held by philosophers today.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
