Abstract

During the Cold War, two basic schools of thought emerged among U.S. Christian leaders and ethicists concerning the implications of the nuclear revolution for the use of force by the United States. The just war thinkers held that nuclear war could in fact be conducted within the bounds of traditional just war principles, particularly those of discrimination and proportionality. Since nuclear weapons could be used in war, it followed that they could and should be developed and produced for that purpose and for the purpose of deterrence. The nuclear pacifists held that nuclear war could not be conducted within the confines of traditional just war principles. Since by its nature nuclear war could not be moral, there was no reason for the development and production of nuclear weapons, except for the purpose of deterrence. And since nuclear deterrence required one to make threats of nuclear destruction that it would not be moral to carry out, and, moreover, carried unacceptable risks of miscalculation and inadvertent or accidental use of nuclear weapons, deterrence itself could not be justified, except perhaps as a temporary way station on the path to nuclear disarmament. Although the just war thinkers initially held sway, over time they became less dominant. By the middle of the 1980s, the U.S. Catholic Church and most of the largest Mainline Protestant denominations had formally adopted a nuclear pacifist position. This essay chronicles the victory of nuclear pacifism in these churches, explains it as a reaction to the nuclear weapons and doctrine advocated by the just war thinkers, and implemented by the U.S. government and military, as well as other events and trends in American society, and inquires as to whether or not the just war thinkers and nuclear pacifists influenced the course of U.S. policy.

Highlights

  • The advent of the atomic age with the U.S bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the SovietUnion’s explosion of a nuclear device in August 1949, and the subsequent development of much more destructive thermonuclear weapons (H-bombs) occasioned, among Christian leaders and churches in the United States, a reexamination of Christian ideas concerning the moral permissibility of war

  • Discussion of the implications of nuclear weapons for Christians and for U.S policy was conducted both within the churches and without

  • In 1974, the Nixon Administration, influenced heavily by Henry Kissinger, the national security advisor and former Harvard professor whose 1957 book, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy made the case for limited nuclear war, adopted the so-called “Schlesinger Doctrine,” named for Secretary of State James Schlesinger

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Summary

Introduction

The advent of the atomic age with the U.S bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Soviet. Union’s explosion of a nuclear device in August 1949, and the subsequent development of much more destructive thermonuclear weapons (H-bombs) occasioned, among Christian leaders and churches in the United States, a reexamination of Christian ideas concerning the moral permissibility of war. Discussion of the implications of nuclear weapons for Christians and for U.S policy was conducted both within the churches and without. Since nuclear weapons could be used in war, it followed that they could and should be developed and produced for that purpose and for the purpose of preventing war through deterrence. This view held that a credible nuclear war-fighting capability was essential to successful deterrence. In examining the causes and consequences of this shift, it is useful to begin with a brief overview of U.S Christian thinking about war and peace on the eve of the atomic age

Christian Pacifism and Just War in the Pre-Nuclear Era
The Just War Thinkers
The Rise of Nuclear Pacifism
The Triumph of Nuclear Pacifism
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