From Detachment to Immersion: Wittgenstein and ‘The Problem of Life’

Abstract

Wittgenstein is widely recognised as a philosopher with a markedly ethical character to his thought. This paper seeks to highlight the dimension of selflessness and renunciation in this ethical character. It also seeks to show that there are distinct differences in Wittgenstein's implicit conception of what an ethical selflessness amounts to in the early and the later periods. The concept of absolute safety enables us to appreciate the connections between the early Wittgenstein and a particular type of nineteenth‐century obsession with a selflessness that combines with a self‐sufficient capacity to stand aloof from anxiety in the face of the human condition involving meaninglessness and death. In the early Wittgenstein that aloofness came close to a solipsistic and, in some ways, self‐affirming apartness from everything other than the self. In contrast, the ethical spirit that permeates Wittgenstein's later thought is imbued with a sense of the immersion of the self ultimately and absolutely ‘in the world’. The sense in which this latter phrase is used is defined further in the paper.