Abstract
AbstractIn the first paragraph, the focus is on the early Wittgenstein's conception of truth: the Disquotational Schema is shown to be derivable from the semantic and ontological principles of the picture theory. Then, the article scrutinises the way the Disquotational Schema provides the basis for what the later Wittgenstein takes as a philosophically appropriate description of the practice of making assertions. The general abstract notion of truth makes room for a situated notion of warranted assertibility as the key‐notion. Last, the issue of how Wright's Argument from Informational Neutrality could be neutralised from the later Wittgenstein's viewpoint is dealt with.
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