From defection to ingroup favoritism to cooperation: simulation analysis of the social dilemma in dynamic networks

Abstract

The emergence of cooperation in social dilemmas is a core question in the social sciences, the proposed solution being ingroup favoritism, a conditional strategy where individuals only cooperate with members of their own group. However, empirical literature has suggested that ingroup favoritism prevents one from realizing profitable interactions with outgroup members. Such an observation calls for a theoretical analysis that would help in understanding what factors affect the transition from ingroup favoritism to unconditional cooperation. Here, we conducted computational experiments in which agents located in social networks imitate traits of successful neighbors or sever social ties with defecting neighbors and connect them to other agents. The results of our simulation showed transitions from unconditional defection to ingroup favoritism to unconditional cooperation with a more frequent occurrence of link rewiring. This indicates the usefulness of the dynamic-networks framework in understanding the reason why cooperation is achieved in specific societies and why different types of cooperation are observed in different ones.