From Daimonion to The “Last” God

Abstract

(ProQuest: ... denotes non-USASCII text omitted.) Blaise Pascal famously distinguished between God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob (and of Christians) and God of philosophers. The first is God of religious beUever, personal, loving God (of whatever reUgious tradition) that offers hope of salvation to beUever and fear of punishment and damnation to nonbeliever. The second refers to all those abstract ultimate realities that have accumulated throughout history of Western philosophy that complete some comprehensive, inteUectual view of all that is (and has been or will be). To this distinction we also might add another sort of God, what Richard Rorty caUed God of theologians, sort of God that results from running together needs of religious beuevers with needs of by changing label of latest philosophical costume.1 Rorty specifically had in mind Paul TilUch's theological knockoff of Heidegger's Sein and Mark Taylor's appropriation of Derrida's differance, but his label would include everything from Philo's use of Plotinus and Aquinas's use of Aristotle to process theology's reinterpretation of Whitehead, to recent efforts by philosophers working in Continental tradition to reconcile postmodernism with Biblical themes.2 These distinctions, however, overlook more original, more primordial sense of what is divine: of thinker. The early Greeks named this understanding of divinity daimon (...), naming which is heard at crossroads between philosophy and religion, between eariier and later Greek thinking, in Socrates' talk of what inspires and drives him. Interestingly, twentieth century philosopher Martin Heidegger wrestles with meaning of daimon in his interpretations of Plato, Aristotle, and early Greek thinkers, hinting at his own understanding of what is named in the (der letzte Gott). This is field I want to survey in this paper: what are meanings of daimon and last god, and how do they name of thinker. We begin with Socrates, paradigmatic thinker of Western philosophy. In course of his trial, Socrates notes that: I am subject to (daimonion; ...), which Meletus saw fit to travesty in his indictment. It began in my early childhood - sort of voice which comes to me, and when it comes it always dissuades me from what I am proposing to do, and never urges me on. (Plato, Apology, 31c-d)3 Socrates' daimonion apparently was well known; both Plato and Xenophon note or have Socrates refer to his daimonion number of times. In addition, as Socrates observes here, his daimonion is part of what is at issue in his indictment; aU sources note that Socrates was charged with introducing or bringing in daimonia (...).4 Socrates' daimonion was clearly important to who he was and to what he was charged with being. As first reading, noncommital translation of daimonion as something divine seems most appropriate. On one hand, many of earliest Greek writers (e.g., Homer, Pindar, Greek tragedians) use term daimon in conjunction with theos (...), such as in stock ending for Euripides' plays: Many forms are there of (daimonion; ...). Many things gods (theoi; ...) accomplish unexpectedly. What we waited for does not come to pass, while for what remained undreamed (theos; ...) finds ways. Just such doing was this doing.5 The two terms - daimoni and theos - are and are not exactly interchangeable. Lacking an image or cult, ... often indicates strange sort of or power rather than class of beings. In that sense, daimon is similar to o theos (...), which means god or the in generic sense, not particular and individual gods of Greek pantheon. Naming a force that drives man forward where no agent can be named, one way to understand daimon then is as the veiled countenance of activity that is invoked when event or action eludes characterization and naming. …