Abstract
Grounded in a social scientific research approach, the present case study traces the shift in the German nuclear regulatory culture from prevention to preparedness, the latter of which builds upon decision support systems for nuclear emergency management. These systems integrate atmospheric dispersion models for tracing radioactive materials released accidentally from nuclear facilities. For atmospheric dispersion modelers and emergency managers, this article provides a critical historical perspective on the practical, epistemic, and organizational issues surrounding the use of decision support systems for nuclear emergency management. This perspective suggests that atmospheric dispersion models are embedded within an entire assemblage of institutions, technologies, and practices of preparedness, which are challenged by the uniqueness of each nuclear accident.
Highlights
In the history of nuclear technology, major shifts in national cultures of risk assessment and mitigation seem to align well with dramatic events
The more focused concept of “sociotechnical imaginary” is explained in Section 3) The key to understanding this evolution, I believe, is to focus on the technologies and practices used in Germany as a regime of nuclear disaster preparedness, which ensured the continued operation of nuclear power plants in that country after the Chernobyl accident
This residual risk mitigation principle became the substance of preparedness in the post-Chernobyl nuclear era, which facilitated a return to state-assured nuclear safety and security for its citizens through the “(re)creation of predictability and order” in line with the German political tradition
Summary
In the history of nuclear technology, major shifts in national cultures of risk assessment and mitigation seem to align well with dramatic events. The paper is organized as follows: It begins with a review of the relevant social scientific literature on the Fukushima nuclear accident before introducing the theoretical framing and research design It traces the shift in German nuclear regulatory culture, from prevention to mitigation, back to 1986 and provides some insights into the technologies and practices of German nuclear emergency preparedness and the way in which they were used in Germany during the Fukushima accident. It discusses how German emergency preparedness was challenged by the Fukushima experience, based on official reports on the accident from Germany and Japan. These issues are discussed in light of the German nuclear phase-out decision
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