From behaviour to consciousness: Translating what animals do to what animals think

Abstract

Cognitive ethology, an interdisciplinary and comparative branch of zoology, is concerned with the influence of conscious awareness and intention on animal behaviour. It enquires into the evolutionary value of consciousness. However, consciousness is hard to define and any account of animal behaviour based on it will need to take into account both the physical mechanisms that allow for consciousness, and also consider whether we can have knowledge of the phenomenal experience of consciousness in other species. While the first consideration can be investigated scientifically, phenomenal experience needs to be inferred from behaviour, since most animals are not capable of communicating this experience directly. In fact, many accounts of animal behaviour, behavioural ecology in particular, argue that we cannot accurately explain animal behaviour with relation to thoughts or feelings and conscious awareness of them. Rather, we must concern ourselves with what can be objectively observed and measured. Cognitive ethology, however, argues that we cannot give accurate accounts of complex animal behaviour, for example social interactions or tool use, without taking consciousness into account. In this article I will argue that one can justifiably assign and study consciousness in animals through their behaviour, and that an account of certain animals’ behaviour is incomplete without reference to conscious awareness. In other words, behavioural ecology is essentially flawed as it gives, in certain cases, ultimately incorrect accounts of animal behaviour. Firstly it cannot distinguish between behaviour of more and less conscious animals, and secondly, by avoiding any mention of consciousness, it narrows its own scope, and finally cannot explain complex behaviours such as learning in any meaningful way.