What is moral fetishism?

Abstract

According to Kant, an action is morally praiseworthy when it is performed on the basis of the “motive of duty”, because the action is morally right. In the contemporary literature, this view is known as the de dicto account of moral worth. And, the de dicto account has in recent years been supplanted by the de re account, which holds instead that an action is morally praiseworthy when it is performed on the basis of those reasons that make the action right in the first place; that is, on the basis of its right-making features. One popular argument against the de dicto view and in favour of the de re view is that the former is “fetishistic”. This charge of fetishism was originally laid by Michael Smith, and has been taken up by very many supporters of the de re view since. But, this article asks, what is moral fetishism, and in what way is the de dicto view (purportedly) guilty of it? In this article, I consider four possible readings of the fetishism charge. I ultimately argue that the de dicto account evades them all.