From agents and structures to minds and bodies: of supervenience, quantum, and the linguistic turn

Abstract

This article argues that ‘middle-ground’ constructivism is based on an uneasy tension between mental causality and rump materialism that shows itself as a conflict between upward determination of ideas and their downward causation on the material world. Even Alexander Wendt's recent turn to quantum and a holographic model of society does not solve this problem. Instead, his turn shows that the more mental causality and thus an autonomy of ‘consciousness’ is granted, the more an ontologically based constructivism becomes implausible. In clarifying differences and similarities between different strands of constructivism, this article argues for a reorientation of our focus on the mind–body problem. From this perspective, however, constructivism presents itself not as some middle ground, but is rather characterized by its attempt to overcome Cartesian categories.