Aristotle’s Undivided Self

Abstract

Abstract Several arguments are examined which, if convincing, would justify the rejection of Aristotle’s contention that psychological phenomena are, in the sense explained, inextricably psycho-physical. The arguments considered are designed to support the claim that desire, perception, and the emotions have to be defined in terms of two definitionally separate components, one purely psychological, the other purely physical. Several of these arguments were developed by Descartes and subsequent philosophers to set up the mind–body problem that we confront today. These arguments, I suggest, do not compel the rejection of Aristotle’s position, as they rest on assumptions that he would, with good reason, not accept. Indeed, if we are entitled to adopt his position as our starting point, we can effectively undermine the arguments ranged against it. Aristotle, so understood, offers a way to dissolve the mind–body problem we have inherited by challenging the very terms in which it has been formulated. Nor does his approach require us, as some have suggested, to adopt a radically alien, ‘pan psychic’, account of matter. His views constitute an alternative to basic elements of our conventional thinking about psychological phenomena and their place in a material world. They offer, in effect, the resources to dissolve, rather than solve, the mind–body problem we have inherited. Properly understood, they point to a new, and potentially more fruitful, way to study a wide range of psychological phenomena.