French nuclear testing: A fool's errand

Abstract

Tariq Rauf is Director of the International Organizations and Nonproliferation Project of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Previously, he served as Nonproliferation Expert at the Office of the Ambassador for Disarmament, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in Canada, and Senior Associate at the Canadian Centre for Global Security. Only personal views are expressed in this viewpoint. Despite protests from all parts of the world, France resumed underground nuclear testing on September 5, 1995, for the ostensible reason of calibrating equipment to facilitate computer simulations designed to check the reliability of French nuclear warheads. France detonated a small nuclear device equivalent to about 8,000 tons of TNT at its Mururoa test-site in the South Pacific (Centre d’Experimentations du Pacific). Some arms control experts, however, believe that the real reason for the series of tests is to certify a new nuclear warhead (TN-76/TN-100) for the M-45/M-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile (and also possibly for a new cruise missile, though this seems unlikely). Despite strong international opposition, France carried out a second nuclear test, in the current series, at Fangataufa on October 1. Announced on June 13, 1995, by the new President of France Jacques Chirac as his presidential debut on the international stage, this new series of up to eight tests, did not come as a surprise, though it was roundly criticized internationally. Only Colonel Mu’ammar alQadhdhafi, the Libyan leader, endorsed Chirac’s plan. In his election campaign, Chirac noted the necessity of temporarily resuming testing, which had been suspended by his predecessor President Francois Mitterand in 1992, to maintain France’s nuclear arsenal. Chirac’s presidential announcement also noted that the new series of tests would be concluded by May 1996, and that France would then go on to sign a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in the fall of 1996. The resumption of French nuclear weapon testing has evoked strong criticism internationally and has resulted in France being perceived as somewhat of a nuclear pariah, particularly by nations in the South Pacific. Australia and Chile recalled their envoys from Paris, while New Zealand, Japan, and South Pacific Forum nations issued condemnations, and peace groups set up protests ranging from Europe to the South Pacific. The inopportune political timing and insensitivity of France’s testing program is only exceeded by that of China, which conducted a nuclear test in mid-May, barely three days after the ending of the historic Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 1995 Review and Extension Conference. Ironically, France played a constructive role at that conference by helping shape language on two key decisions (i.e. “principles and objectives” and “strengthened review”) to which it is a party. In its efforts to justify its testing program, the French government has linked its international stature and influence to its nuclear weapon capabilities and has even offered to extend its nuclear umbrella to defend its European Union (E.U.) partners. These blandishments, however, have not gone over well as several E.U. members have questioned French political wisdom and sincerity. Perhaps more significantly, the standing of both President Chirac and his government in domestic public opinion in France has markedly declined. In order to properly assess France’s position on the necessity of the current series of tests, it would be useful to briefly examine the history of the French nuclear testing program, its nuclear force posture, as well as France’s stance toward nuclear arms control.