Freedom of Speech in Early Stuart England (review)

Abstract

Reviewed by: Freedom of Speech in Early Stuart England D. Alan Orr Freedom of Speech in Early Stuart England. By David Colclough. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. xiv, 293 pp. £ 45.00. ISBN 0521847486. David Colclough's Freedom of Speech in Early Stuart England examines the concept of free speech and its relationship to conceptions of political liberty in England during the period 1603-28. Following the work of Quentin Skinner and David Norbrook on republicanism and civic identity, Colclough argues that, despite the realities of monarchical government, the concept of free speech allowed subjects to take on public identities as citizens that enabled them, in times of extreme necessity, to address political and religious matters not normally deemed within their competence. Rather than discussing classical republicanism in early Stuart England in terms of a coherent cluster of themes and values, Colclough offers a more subtle interpretation of early Stuart political thought and culture, situating the concept of free speech both in relation to the rhetorical culture of the day, and to contemporary debates on the liberty of the subject. The body of the book consists in an introduction, epilogue, and four substantive chapters focusing primarily on the period from 1603 to 1628. These chapters draw on a range of primary sources including, not only rhetorical manuals and treatises, printed pamphlets and sermons, but also the parliamentary record, and manuscript miscellanies. The first of these chapters establishes the general framework, addressing the relationship of free speech (parrhesia) to the classical rhetorical traditions of ancient Greece and Rome, as well as their reception and appropriation in Elizabethan England. The second chapter addresses the relationship of parrhesia to religious affairs, arguing that free speech had firm biblical foundations, and suggesting that English republicanism, as embodied in the writings of Thomas Scott during the 1620s, grew not only from Scott's reading of classical republican texts, but from his protestantism; for example, in opposing the proposed Spanish match, Colclough argues that Scott took on the civic identity of a citizen-prophet to address matters of state such as marriage alliances customarily reserved solely to the crown. The third chapter addresses the question of free speech in the early Stuart parliaments; here Colclough follows post-revisionist scholarship in emphasizing the prevalence of ideological conflict, as well as recent scholarship on English republicanism that has argued for the pervasiveness of a 'neo-Roman' conception of liberty in English public life. The final chapter, 'Freedom of Speech and Manuscript Miscellanies', is arguably the strongest, offering some of the most substantive and detailed research. Colclough's examination of libels and 'pasquils' in manuscript miscellanies integrates debates on free speech [End Page 414] with recent scholarship on the manuscript transmission of news and the activities of reading and writing as forms of civic engagement. Freedom of Speech represents a very high standard of scholarship. Furthermore, Colclough is a cautious scholar, who generally avoids the tendency to overstatement that has marred much work on the emergence of republican consciousness prior to 1649. However, he might have explored even further the neo-Roman conception of liberty as non-domination which has been prominent in so much of Quentin Skinner's recent work. Furthermore, although he frequently cites Skinner's writings, particularly his Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge, 1998), Colclough makes little or no reference to Philip Pettit's equally important Republicanism. A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford, 1997); this is, of course, a work to which Professor Skinner has frequently referred in his discussion of the 'third' concept of liberty and the neo-Roman theory of free states, both critically and approvingly. There is also the crucial relationship of free speech to what Pettit has referred to as 'traditional non-dominating institutions' - the institutions of the common law of England.1 Colclough might have at least touched on this issue, especially given the undeniable depth to which juridical forms and language permeated early modern English political culture. Although the prevailing conception of liberty in early Stuart England might be fairly characterized as 'neo-Roman,' the constitutional bulwark that existed for the defence of liberty still lay primarily with appeals to the Magna Carta and the traditions of the common law...