Freedom of speech and cognitive vices. Kant's and current Kantian perspectives

Abstract

Whereas liberal philosophers, from Mill to Rawls, traditionally make a plea for a very extensive freedom of opinion and of the press, invoking the no harm principle, in the last two decades, such liberal philosophers as Onora O’Neill and Jürgen Habermas, rightly worrying about the rise of antidemocratic and illiberal tendencies in the social media and on the increasing diffusion of fake news, advocate not only a self-limitation of the press, but also for substantial restrictions on the freedom of the press. Yet, their references to Kant and Mill entail a deep misunderstanding of their argument in favor of the freedom of opinion. This article attempts to demonstrate that, instead of sheltering public debates from wrong contents, one should promote the capacity of judgement of all individual participants against cognitive vices, which requires individuals to be exposed not only to true contents, but also to wrong and noxious contents.