Freedom of Expression, Secularism and Defamation of Religion: The Case of Charlie Hebdo

Peonidis Peonidis

doi:10.3390/socsci8100276

Abstract

I argue that under normal circumstances a state that is liberal and secular should not use its legal apparatus to suppress the publication of cartoons like those that triggered the deadly terrorist attack on the premises of Charlie Hebdo in 2015, if it is determined to abide by its core values. These values, which include religious neutrality, religious freedom, and unhindered freedom of criticism, imply that individual citizens are prima facie legally free to express their disapproval of particular religions or religious faith in general, through any non-violent means they consider appropriate, including parody and ridicule. This idea is open to various objections. Those focusing on the protection of religion as such can be easily dismissed, but the charge that defamation of religion causes offence to believers has to be taken seriously. Nevertheless, I defend the view that we need something stronger than taking offense to justifiably ban harsh religious criticism. In particular, I argue that, if the above sort of criticism prevents its recipients from exercising their basic rights or it incites third parties to engage in criminal activities against the above individuals, it should be subject to legal sanctions. However, this is not the case with the cartoons that appeared in Charlie Hebdo, since, as far as I can tell, no basic rights of French Muslims were violated, and no violent actions were committed against them as a result of their publication.

Highlights

The assassination of many individuals during a terrorist attack on the premises of the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in January 2015, which was triggered by the publication of a series of cartoons mocking the Prophet Muhammad, was wholeheartedly denounced in many parts of the world
I will argue in this essay that, if a liberal and secular state desires to abide by its basic tenets, under normal circumstances,2 it should condone the publication of cartoons such as those that appeared in Charlie Hebdo
As a matter of principle, a liberal and secular state should not ban publications like Charlie Hebdo, which are engaged in defaming particular religions or religion in general

Summary

Introduction

The assassination of many individuals during a terrorist attack on the premises of the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in January 2015, which was triggered by the publication of a series of cartoons mocking the Prophet Muhammad, was wholeheartedly denounced in many parts of the world. Even if we grant that it was committed in the heat of anger, it was totally unjustifiable within the framework of the set of basic principles and rights that was recognized by the international community after the end of War World II. The assassination of many individuals during a terrorist attack on the premises of the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in January 2015, which was triggered by the publication of a series of cartoons mocking the Prophet Muhammad, was wholeheartedly denounced in many parts of the world.. Shouldn’t we take the idea of legally prohibiting the defamation of all religions seriously—not because of fear of reprisals from infuriated believers, but because there are overarching secular moral reasons to move in this direction?. Satanic Verses and the blasphemous cartoons published in Jyllands-Posten and Charlie Hebdo, it has reached a public far wider than the closed circle of constitutional lawyers and human rights experts. I will argue in this essay that, if a liberal and secular state desires to abide by its basic tenets, under normal circumstances, it should condone the publication of cartoons such as those that appeared in Charlie Hebdo. But nothing prevents it from finding fertile soil in other parts of the world

The Main Argument

Possible Exceptions

Conclusions